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Abstract 
This study uses an incentive-compatible experimental online supermarket to assess whether 
prior environmentally-friendly behaviour outside the store and carbon taxes motivate 
sustainable consumption. Previous research suggests that past decisions may influence current 
decisions because consumers compensate morally desirable and undesirable acts over time, and 
carbon taxes have been promoted as effective tools to reduce the carbon footprint of food 
baskets. After controlling for past consumption, results show that being required to recall past 
environmentally-friendly behaviour before shopping led consumers to purchase more 
sustainable food baskets. Carbon taxation also strongly reduces the carbon footprint of food 
baskets, showing no interaction with the task of recalling past behaviours.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We use a novel incentive-compatible experimental design involving an online supermarket to 
study interventions designed to reduce the carbon footprint of actual food choices. Our research 
is motivated by current concerns over the sustainability of current food consumption (e.g. 
Garnett 2011; Grunert, Hieke, and Wills 2014; McMichael et al. 2007). Carbon emissions from 
food choices are estimated to account for around 30% of total household greenhouse gas 
emission in developed economies, with supermarkets capturing a large share of food 
expenditures (e.g., Panzone, Wossink, and Southerton 2013). As a result, there is increasing 
recognition that an effective sustainability policy requires the direct involvement of consumers 
(Dietz et al. 2009; Vandenbergh and Steinemann 2007), and that differing consumer choices 
in-store can lead to significant reductions in the carbon footprint of food baskets (Panzone et 
al. 2016). However, research on actual sustainable behaviour in supermarkets is limited, both 
in terms of assessing the sustainability of current food choices, and of designing persuasive 
instruments to motivate sustainable consumption. Our paper addresses this by testing whether 
the recall of past environmentally-friendly behaviour, and the use of a carbon tax are effective 
in reducing the carbon footprint of supermarket food shopping. To ensure incentive 
compatibility, consumers made real choices and actually received the goods they purchased.  
Food choices are driven by a number of interconnected factors, such as price, taste, 
healthiness, and environmental impact (see, for instance, Dubois, Griffith, and Nevo 2014; 
Hoppert et al. 2012; Raghunathan, Walker Naylor, and Hoyer 2006). While preferences for all 
these attributes contribute to the decisions consumers make, the focus of this article is on the 
environmental impact of food choices, measured as their carbon footprint. Environmental 
preservation, for instance in the form of low-carbon food baskets, is a public good (Daube and 
Ulph 2016): the damage caused to the environment by a consumer purchasing high-carbon 
foods affects him as well as other consumers who buy low-carbon options instead. The pursuit 
of a low-carbon diet may then require consumers to give up personal benefits (in the case of 
food choices, e.g., accept a less desired flavour, or pay a higher price) to the advantage of social 
benefits (higher environmental quality). This propensity to prioritise social over private 
outcomes correlates with an individual’s engagement in activities that protect the environment 
(Jia et al. 2017), and green consumerism is generally considered an ethical way of shopping 
(Mazar and Zhong 2010). Food consumption is also recurrent, so that consumers are called 
upon to manifest their morality repeatedly (e.g., in a weekly shopping trip): choices carrying 
environmental implications can be made within the same consumption episode (e.g. an initial 
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choice between high-carbon meat or low-carbon meat substitutes, followed by the choice 
between organic or standard vegetables), as well as across episodes (e.g. purchasing high-
carbon meat again this week, after having purchased it last week). This time dimension makes 
habitual consumption a relevant barrier to behaviour change (Warde 2014), as some products 
may be purchased routinely, without paying attention to their impact on the environment. 
Finally, over time food choices may be influenced by behaviour in other consumption domains 
(e.g. purchasing low-carbon food in a supermarket after having saved water in the past week).  
We experimentally investigate strategies that can encourage environmentally responsible 
behaviour in a simulated on-line supermarket2. Focusing on the carbon footprint of the basket 
as the behavioural variable, our first manipulation is a nudge that tests whether reminding 
consumers of their recent pro-environmental behaviour motivates subsequent sustainable 
consumption. This manipulation also allows testing whether pro-environmental behaviour in 
another domain acts as a complement (they co-occur) or a substitute (one comes at the expense 
of the other) for sustainable consumption in supermarket shopping (e.g. Greenberg 2014; 
Nauges and Wheeler 2017). The study of pro-environmental behaviour in a single domain 
implicitly assumes that one observation of pro-environmental behaviour is sufficient to 
characterise the environmental preferences of an agent, because underlying preferences are 
stable and cognitive dissonance processes (Festinger 1962) act to make behaviours consistent 
with underlying psychological states. For example, cognitive dissonance can explain 
compensatory behaviours in cases where individuals go into “moral debit” following an 
antisocial act, and react by doing something desirable: for instance, an initial attitude-behaviour 
inconsistency (e.g., overconsuming water despite caring for its conservation in Dickerson et al. 
1992) may lead people to restore the positive link between environmental attitudes and 
behaviour (e.g. by shortening their shower) when this inconsistency is made salient. However, 
this personological model of morality fails to explain why over time individuals may alternate 
moral and immoral behaviours (Effron and Conway 2015; Gino, Norton, and Weber 2016; 
Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Miller and Effron 2010). In particular, this 
approach does not explain instances of moral licensing where “desirable” (e.g. pro-social) acts 
motivate subsequent “undesirable” acts (Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010): for 
example, a consumer may feel justified in buying a high-carbon meat product after purchasing 
organic fruit. 
                                                          
2 The store is similar to Demarque et al. (2015), who studied the impact of normative reference points on the 
purchase of eco-labelled products. 
4 
 
To allow for a more general representation of moral behaviour, Monin and Jordan (2009) 
present a dynamic model of self-regulation where morality is driven by the moral self-image 
of the agent: individuals use past moral behaviour to remove the concern of appearing uncaring 
in subsequent moral tasks (moral licensing, e.g. Mazar and Zhong 2010; Mullen and Monin 
2016); while past immoral behaviour motivates individuals to make reparations in present 
choices (moral cleansing, e.g. Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin 2009). This approach views 
individuals as targeting a certain level of moral self-regard that they aim to achieve and 
maintain. In this view, when facing a moral dilemma individuals will engage in moral 
behaviour whenever the perceived moral self-worth accumulated through past choices is below 
a desired level; and may behave immorally when the perceived moral self-worth is above the 
desired level. To this extent, moral licensing or cleansing are special instances of self-
regulation strategies that balance socially desirable and undesirable behaviours and are likely 
to occur to consumers experiencing conflicting consumption goals, e.g. hedonic pleasure and 
eating healthily (see, for instance, Dhar and Simonson 1999; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Laran 
and Janiszewski 2009; Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan 2008). However, few 
studies have focused on pro-social goals, and these have produced evidence consistent with 
both moral licensing (Tiefenbeck et al. 2013) as well as consistency (Greenberg 2014) across 
consumption domains. 
The second manipulation explores the role of carbon taxation to drive sustainable low-
carbon behaviour in supermarkets. Carbon taxes are often considered a key instrument to 
reduce global warming by increasing the cost of consumption-related greenhouse gas emissions 
(Boardman 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Pearce 1991). Previous work on carbon taxes 
indicates they potentially reduce total household emissions by up to 80% (Metcalf and 
Weisbach 2009), particularly by reducing energy consumption (Brännlund and Nordström 
2004). In the particular context of food policy, interventions have focused on nutrient-based 
taxes, targeting alcohol (Panzone 2012), sugar (Zizzo et al. 2016), or fat content (Papoutsi et 
al. 2015). A carbon tax mirrors nutrient-based interventions by taxing a constituent of food 
products with environmental instead of health implications. However, there is limited research 
on their impact on consumption (e.g. Briggs et al. 2016). Because green taxes are designed 
primarily to reduce externalities rather than raise revenues (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Pearce 
1991), the carbon tax in the experiment is designed to ensure revenue-neutrality by returning 
earnings to consumers as income. Note that the carbon tax was announced to consumers, thus 
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potentially sending a signal about the environmental quality of each product (Hilton et al. 
2014).  
We also test for the interaction of taxes and environmental recall, because we may expect 
price interventions to influence pro-environmental motivation (see Bowles and Polania-Reyes 
2012; Rode, Gómez-Baggethun, and Krause 2015). Taxes can motivate consumers by 
signalling the importance of sustainability in the mind of the policymaker; or demotivate them 
by removing the ability to self-signal interest in pro-social behaviour (Bowles and Polania-
Reyes 2012; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). Testing this proposition specifically on 
grocery, Perino, Panzone, and Swanson (2014) show that subsidising sustainable products can 
indeed reduce their consumption.  
The rest of the article is as follows. The next section discusses the simple model of moral 
self-regulation used to describe the consumer decision problem. This section also explains how 
the experimental treatments can be used to increase consistency in the purchase of low-carbon 
baskets. Section 3 describes the data collection method, which measures consumer supermarket 
behaviour and attitudes and beliefs concerning the environment over a two-week period as well 
as out-of-store pro-environmental behaviour between the two shopping occasions. Section 4 
presents the results of the econometric analysis. Results indicate that both taxes and the 
requirement to recall previous environmental behaviours strongly influence behaviour with 
similar strength such that the behavioural intervention would have the same impact as a 
£70/tonne CO2e carbon tax. Section 5 discusses the implications of these results for policy and 
future research. Finally, Section 6 briefly concludes.  
2. MORAL SELF-REGULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, AND 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
This section sets out a simple model of consumer behaviour when individuals care about both 
the direct hedonic pleasure and the environmental impact of the goods they buy. The section 
will then contextualise the theoretical implications of the experimental manipulations, also 
identifying testable hypotheses in an econometric model of demand for carbon emissions.  
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2.1. A model of moral consumer behaviour  
Consider a consumer i with characteristics Di. Following Dubois et al. (2014), during a weekly 
shop for food, the consumer is faced with a choice of j = 1,…, J products of K characteristics, 
specifically their carbon footprint cj, kilocalories zj,, and other observable characteristics, e.g. 
packaging (omitted for simplicity). Goods are sold with market prices pj., j = 1,…,J. The 
consumer faces a budget constraint E, so that  
∑  + = 
 + =         (1) 
where Yi are in-store expenditures, wi is the outside good (savings, in the experiment below), 
which for simplicity has a unit price ( = 1), and xij is the quantity of good j purchased. In 
the experiment below, the expenditure limit E is the same for every consumer, but we leave the 
suffix i to retain generality. Apart from the direct utility the consumer derives from consuming 
xij, the consumer gains utility from: a) the morality of consumption, which we contextualise as 
the environmental impact of a good (e.g. Cornelissen et al. 2008; Mazar and Zhong 2010), and 
is therefore negatively related to the carbon footprint cj; and b) the healthiness of consumption, 
whose impact is negatively related to the indicator variable zj. Notably, the characteristics cj 
and zj measure the damage to the environment and health respectively caused by the 
consumption of one unit of good j. 
Similar to a bank account, the consumer can earn moral (environmental) credits by 
engaging in activities that protect the (environmental) public good, and consume them in 
activities that damage it. The flow of environmental and health benefits the consumer derives 
from consumption are defined as 
 =  − ∑  =  −       (2) 
ℎ = ℎ − ∑  = ℎ −       (3) 
where  and ℎ are the credits earned in all other activities, while  = ∑   and  =
∑   refer to the total amount of characteristic consumed. Equation (2) indicates that an 
individual i’s self-worth corresponds to the moral credits earned in all other areas of behaviour, 
, minus the credits lost by the carbon footprint  of the individual’s consumption choices. 
Equation (3) replicates this process for health considerations. Health decisions could also give 
moral credits that would enter equation (2); for instance, a consumer may believe that foods 
high in kilocalories are morally undesirable because obesity causes an unnecessary economic 
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burden on public healthcare3. However, in what follows  captures the rather narrow focus of 
environmental credits, measured as the carbon footprint of the good. As such, the impact of 
kilocalories on the environment is indirect and driven by the emission of those CO2e required 
to produce the food and the energy it provides4, and their impact already enters equation (2). 
Therefore, we assume the impact of kilocalories has individual specific effects which can be 
self-regulated in terms of health credits as measured by equation (3) (see e.g., Chernev 2011), 
and we do not discuss equation (3) further. 
In a basket formation task, the objective of the consumer is to determine the quantity of 
each product j to purchase, , by maximising the utility function (Dubois et al. 2014; 
Hanemann 1984; Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta 1999; Nair, Dubé, and Chintagunta 2005)  
max
,
 , !, … , #,  , ℎ , $   
subject to the usual budget constraint (1), as well as the moral and health constraints (2) and 
(3). Assuming quantities are continuous, the resulting first-order condition is  
0i i i ij j j
ij i i i
U U U U
c z p
x m h w
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− − − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
The resulting demand functions for individual i are: 
 = %( , . . , #, , , ℎ 	)       (4a) 
for j = 1, …, J, from which consumer j’s resulting carbon footprint is:  
1( ,..., , , , ) (.)i J i i i i ij j ij
j j
C p p E m h c x c d= =∑ ∑      (4b) 
Assuming separability of the utility function to eliminate cross-price effects, the utility function 
can be written as 
( , , ℎ , ) = ∑ $ +())() + (**(ℎ) +	   (5) 
where () ((*) is the weight the individual gives to well-being from moral self-worth (health) 
relative to the direct utility from the consumption of the goods, which is expected to be 
influenced by shocks to moral self-worth. This approach assumes full separability of any 
                                                          
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.   
4 Notably, the Spearman correlation between carbon footprint and the energy content of the 620 foods in the store 
is ρ = 0.53 (p < 0.001).  
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consumption outside the experimental design to the extent that consumers are expected to 
obtain the same utility from items consumed in the experimental store as well as outside of it.  
This model is one in which the individual cares about her flow of moral self-worth. Ulph, 
Panzone, and Hilton (2018) generalise this to a multi-period model in which the individual also 
cares about her stock of moral self-worth (Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Mullen and Monin 2016; 
Zhong, Liljenquist, and Cain 2009). For the purposes of the empirical research, the model set 
out above is dynamic only in the sense that it allows us to capture the effect of a prior change 
to the individual’s flow of moral self-worth m0i as we explain below.   
2.2. Keeping up with the past: Environmental recall as a nudge  
A first treatment gives an unexpected exogenous shock of size θi to the individual’s flow of 
moral self-worth mi, prior to entering the store. The flow of moral self-worth changes as 
 =  −  + +         (6) 
This shock can, in theory, be positive or negative. However, this section focuses on a positive 
and exogenous shock, which is the case in our experiment5. Then the parameter θi gives a 
temporary boost to moral self-worth, which can be seen as a windfall in moral credits that the 
individual suddenly finds in her initial moral credits account, now equal to  + + . From 
equation (5), there are two possible effects of this shock. The first, direct, effect is through 
)(): the increase in the flow of moral self-worth licences the consumer to reduce the 
amount of effort allocated to current moral consumption because of diminishing marginal 
utility (moral licensing, see Khan and Dhar 2006). This direct effect is then expected to increase 
the carbon footprint of a basket in response to an exogenous increase in the flow of moral self-
worth6. A second, indirect effect is through (): the shock could self-signal personal 
commitment to the moral goal (Baca-Motes et al. 2013; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Gneezy et 
al. 2012), therefore increasing the weight the consumer assigns to the moral component of the 
                                                          
5 The decision to focus on a positive shock was taken on the basis of the existing literature. As described in Mullen 
and Monin (2016), the experimental design needs a “no-shock” baseline to identify the effects of either (or both) 
a positive or negative shock treatment. Because our sample was limited, to ensure sufficient statistical power we 
had to choose between either a positive or a negative shock. The meta-analysis of Blanken, van de Ven, and 
Zeelenberg (2015) finds that the size of moral licensing experiments does not differ significantly when the baseline 
is a negative or a no-shock treatment, suggesting a negative shock is often not different from the control group, 
therefore supporting the notion that the impact may be asymmetric. However, this is not the primary aim of this 
work and we leave this as an avenue for further research.  
6 A negative initial shock would instead result in moral cleansing (Sachdeva et al. 2009), with a subsequent 
reduction in the carbon footprint of the basket. 
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utility function. In other words, the shock may prime greater goal striving (pro-social priming 
or framing effects have been for instance observed in Cookson 2000; Elliott, Hayward, and 
Canon 1998; Liberman, Samuels, and Ross 2004). Notably, this second effect may operate sub-
consciously, i.e., through automatic cognition, as well as consciously (see, for instance, Gino 
et al. 2016). The effect has the opposite direction of the licensing effect, and reduces the carbon 
footprint of the basket. This leads to a first set of hypotheses: 
H1a:  An exogenous shock to environmental self-worth increases the carbon footprint of 
an individual’s shopping basket (licensing effect) if it primarily increases the flow 
of environmental self-worth of the consumer. 
H1b:  An exogenous shock to environmental self-worth reduces the carbon footprint of a 
shopping basket (consistency effect) if it primarily primes an increase in the weight 
given to the moral characteristic during the decision task. 
2.3. Raising the costs of carbon: Carbon taxation as a tool for reducing the 
consumption of carbon emissions 
Carbon taxes are often advocated as an option to reduce the carbon footprint of baskets by 
incorporating the external costs of carbon footprint into the price of the good. The role of price 
instruments in changing behaviour is based on the general premise that price changes force 
consumers to reallocate their budget from the now relatively more expensive (e.g. taxed) 
options to cheaper ones. Specifically, the tax treatment increases the marginal price of the 
carbon footprint by a value T equal to the rate of the tax per unit of carbon footprint, so that the 
price of all goods is increased from  to  + ,, where , = -. Notably, taxation inevitably 
induces both price effects, whereby consumers shift to low CO2 equivalent (CO2e) products
7, 
which are now relatively cheaper because of a lower tax; as well as income effects, as 
consumers buy less because the tax reduces their disposable income. A redistribution 
mechanism embedded into the treatment aims to remove income effects by returning total 
revenues from the tax, ∑ ∑ , , in equal shares to all consumers who paid the tax. In addition, 
our combined tax and redistribution manipulation mirrors the fact that green (Pigouvian) taxes 
                                                          
7 In the remainder of the article, the carbon footprint will be reported in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). 
Specifically, the carbon footprint consists of carbon dioxide (CO2) as well as other gases that affect the atmosphere 
(CFCs and methane, for instance); the carbon footprint converts the damage caused by these gases into the amount 
of CO2 needed to cause the same damage, and adds all the gases into a single metric, known as CO2e. gCO2e 
stands for grams of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
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are normally designed to induce changes in behaviour that benefit the environment, not to raise 
additional revenue for the government, and are designed to be revenue-neutral. 
Apart from a standard direct effect, where the tax reduces consumption by raising market 
prices, the tax can also have an indirect behavioural effect: the mere presence of a tax can have 
psychological effects that either reinforce or diminish the pure economic effect of this policy 
instrument (see e.g. Sunstein and Reisch 2014). For instance, awareness of the tax might trigger 
psychological tax aversion (Sussman and Olivola 2011), psychological reactance (Lamberton 
2013), or signal that the subsidised product is of inferior quality (given the relationship between 
price and expected quality, see Kirmani and Rao 2000). Any one of these responses would lead 
to an additional purely behavioural response that undermines the direct price effect on the 
consumption of undesirable (and taxed) goods (e.g. Zizzo et al. 2016). At the same time, the 
presence of a regulation like a tax may signal to consumers that certain products are “good” 
and others are “bad” for society from the perspective of the policymaker who introduced it, 
activating social preferences that lead to a stronger effect than that of the price change alone 
(Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012). Carbon taxes may also serve an informational function, like 
eco-labels, by helping consumers identify high- and low-carbon choices. However, in this 
article we do not seek to isolate pure price effects from pure behavioural effects of carbon 
taxation, although the two sets of effects are likely to occur in parallel in practical policy 
applications. The second working hypothesis is that  
H2: A revenue-neutral carbon tax will reduce the average carbon footprint of baskets by 
increasing the marginal price of carbon footprint in the basket. 
2.4. The interaction between carbon taxation and environmental recall 
A consumer’s response to carbon taxation may depend on the amount of environmental self-
worth the individual holds. For example, the imposition of a carbon tax may remove the 
priming effect of the self-worth shock, with the result that the self-worth shock is only effective 
in the absence of a tax; indeed, in the presence of a tax consumers may no longer attribute the 
cause of a low-carbon basket to their pro-social preferences, but to a desire to minimise the tax 
paid8 (e.g. Perino et al. 2014; Zuckerman, Iazzaro, and Waldgeir 1979). Then, the shock would 
only operate through )(), causing an increase in the carbon content of the basket. A 
                                                          
8 A similar mechanism also occurs in the forced-constraint treatments of dissonance experiments, see discussion 
in Hilton et al. (2014).  
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negative (carbon-reducing) interaction term could instead result if the priming effect caused by 
the shock increases the effectiveness to the tax, for instance because the consumer perceives 
the pro-social objective of a new regulation (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Gneezy et al. 
2011). Specifically, by increasing , the shock + increases the weight given to the a low-
carbon basket, ()(), increasing the value a consumer places on environmental preservation; 
in turn, this higher value results in an increase in the effort placed on the construction of a low-
carbon basket. Then, the third testable hypothesis is:  
H3: The shock to the moral self-worth and the carbon tax may interact; the sign of this 
interaction will depend on whether the tax removes the priming effect of the shock 
(a negative effect), or if it increases it (a positive effect). 
2.5. Estimation 
The utility maximisation process identifies the optimal consumption of carbon footprint in the 
basket, Ci, as from equation (4b). This carbon footprint depends on: a vector of individual 
characteristics Di, measured in week 2; the carbon footprint purchased in the previous week 
 ; the carbon footprint saved by engaging in environmentally-friendly behaviours in the past 
week, m0i; and the experimental stimuli . ≡ 0+ , -, -+1, where θ and T refer, respectively, to 
the environmental recall and the carbon tax. The demand for carbon emissions in week 2 is 
then specified using the log-linear regression   
23(!) = 4 + 4  + 4!	  + 45	6! + 7. + 8!    (7) 
where 7 ≡ 079, 7: , 7:91. The hypotheses above entail the following results: a licensing effect 
(H1a) implies 79 > 0; a consistency effect (H1b) implies 79 < 0; a successful carbon tax (H2) 
would require 7: < 0; if the tax removes the priming effect of the shock, 7:9 < 0, while if the 
tax increases it, then 7:9 > 0.  
In equation (7), current consumption !, past behaviours  , and carbon saved m0i are 
simultaneously determined: they may depend on the same motivational drivers, and are 
connected by the use of a single metric that identifies the social impact of these behaviours. In 
fact, past behaviours in and out of the store may have been influenced by expectations over 
future behaviours (Cascio and Plant 2015; Khan and Dhar 2007), and past outcomes in turn 
influence present behaviour (Browning and Collado 2007; Khan and Dhar 2006). As a result, 
consumers may decide on the amount they can consume in the second week on the basis of the 
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carbon allowance earned by engaging in past sustainable behaviour, as well as the amount of 
carbon consumed in the shop previously. Thus, consumers are expected to engage in a mental 
accounting exercise (see e.g., Milkman and Beshears 2009), where carbon emissions are split 
into different interconnected areas of consumption. To consistently estimate equation (7), 
carbon purchased in week 1 and saved between the periods are modelled as a function of past 
mental states as  
23() = > + > 	  + >!	6  + ?!      (8) 
23( ) = @ + @ 	6  + 8        (9) 
Equations (7)-(9) are a triangular system of simultaneous equations9 (Imbens and Newey 2009; 
Lahiri and Schmidt 1978), which is estimated using a recursive seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) that allows for unobservable preferences connecting the three decisions. Consistent 
standard errors are obtained from bootstrapping (see e.g., Prucha 1987).  
3. DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A total of 260 students were recruited to participate in an online shopping experiment. They 
were paid a £5 fee purely for their time, and were assigned a £25 weekly budget to shop in the 
store once a week for two consecutive weeks. The online shop presented consumers with 620 
food and (non-alcoholic) drink products currently available in Tesco stores (Figure 1). Key 
criteria for inclusion of products in the store was the availability of an actual full (pre-discount) 
price in Tesco stores, carbon footprint (in CO2e), and nutritional facts (kilocalories, and grams 
of selected macronutrients) for each item. The store uses existing products from Tesco10, which 
have actual carbon footprint measures from a single source and for a wide range of products, 
covering all the categories of interest of the study sample11. Consumers could access the carbon 
footprint and nutritional composition of each product by moving a cursor onto a specific icon12 
(Figure 1). Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, the carbon and nutritional content of the basket was 
                                                          
9 Note that Bajari et al. (2012) deal with a system of equations like (7) and (8) by differencing, which results in 
the main equation regressing present consumption on present and past psychometric variables. The small sample 
in our data exposes the results to multicollinearity, which increases the probability failing to reject a false null 
hypothesis (type II error). At the same time, for identification purposes Bajari et al.’s requires the imposition of 
equality of coefficients over time, a restriction that we do not apply here. Nevertheless, the results using this 
alternative specification lead to similar results on the treatment effects (results are available upon request).   
10 The dataset initially consisted of the products in the list available at 
https://www.tescoplc.com/assets/files/cms/Tesco_Product_Carbon_Footprints_Summary(1).pdf. Tesco kindly 
provided further information on products that were footprinted after this document was published online.  
11 A pre-survey and a survey pilot identified which products the target population purchased more frequently.  
12 The time the cursor spent on the icon was recorded.  
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always accessible next to the total bill, constantly updating as consumers added or removed 
products, providing real-time information.  
Participants were informed at the start that they could spend as much as they wished in 
the store, and any unspent budget was then added to their participation fee and given to them 
at the end of the experiment. Collection worked as a “click-and-collect” scheme: participants 
would come and collect their baskets and their compensation the week after the end of the 
experiment. In the first week, participants shopped with no manipulation in place to provide a 
benchmark level of consumption; the manipulations were introduced in the second week. 
Participants were given the goods they had purchased in one of the two weeks of shopping, 
chosen randomly for each participant at the end of the experiment to ensure that both weeks 
were incentive-compatible shopping experiences. Of the 260 participants recruited, 235 
participated in the first week of shopping, and 230 participants completed two weeks.  
3.1. Experimental design 
The core experimental design consisted of a 2 (environmental recall vs no environmental recall) 
x 2 (carbon tax vs no tax) orthogonal between-participants experimental design for 199 
participants; in addition, an extra group was added to control for possible measurement effects, 
as explained below. The full experimental design is shown in Figure 2. For those participants 
asked to report their environmental self-image before shopping, in each experimental week the 
procedure consisted of the following tasks (in the exact order): they reported their perceived 
environmental self-image (see section 3.3); they shopped; and completed a questionnaire on 
their attitudes and beliefs on the importance of the environment13 (see section 3.3). Socio-
economic characteristics were only collected in week 1 at the end of the questionnaire. A fifth 
“Control group – Self-Image measured After” (henceforth, “Control – SI After”) group (31 
individuals) was included, for whom self-image was measured after shopping in both weeks: 
this group is identical to the “Control” group, apart from the position of the environmental self-
image question, to test whether asking this question before shopping primed participants to buy 
a low-carbon basket. Week 2 was the same as week 1 for each treatment with the following 
two exceptions:  
                                                          
13 Information on attitudes and beliefs on the importance of the environment were collected twice to monitor 
potential changes in the mindset of the consumer.  
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a. An environmental recall manipulation was implemented in the two treatments with 
environmental recall: consumers started by completing a questionnaire that asked them 
to report how frequently they had performed a number of pro-environmental behaviours 
in the previous week. The number of occurrences of a behaviour was multiplied by a 
conversion factor that measures the difference in CO2e between the environmentally-
friendlier and -unfriendlier behaviour, to obtain an estimate of carbon savings that were 
notified to participants (see section 3.1.1 for details). The list of behaviours and the 
conversion factors are reported in Table 1. Consumers answered the environmental self-
image question after filling this questionnaire, and then shopped. 
b. A carbon tax manipulation was implemented in the tax treatments: a carbon tax was 
introduced and changed food prices proportionally to the carbon content of a food 
product (all tax revenue was redistributed; see section 3.1.2 for details).  
3.1.1. Environmental recall manipulation  
The environmental recall treatment required consumers to indicate the frequency over the last 
seven days of a number of environmental behaviours shown in Table 1 below, using a 
questionnaire that requested:   
“Please pause one moment and think about the activities you have done in the past 
week (i.e. in the past 7 days) to help protect the environment for you and for others. 
How often have you done any of these during the last week? 
Carbon savings were estimated for each of these behaviours on the basis of published data in 
order to determine the total amount of CO2e saved by each participant during the seven days 
before the second week of shopping Straight after completing this questionnaire (therefore 
before entering the shop for the second week of shopping ), participants were notified that  
“CONGRATULATIONS! Over the last seven days you have saved [estimated CO2e 
saved] grams of CO2e”.  
This message was delivered just before participants reported their environmental self-image. 
This approach allowed consumers to recall socially desirable acts they performed in the recent 
past, while quantifying the social benefits of such acts using a carbon footprint metric. 
Participants who were not in an environmental recall treatment filled the environmental recall 
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questionnaire at the end of the week 2 shopping and survey, and were not notified of their 
carbon savings.  
3.1.2. Carbon tax manipulation 
In the first week of the experiment, the prices of the goods reflected the exact prices consumers 
would find in Tesco stores (removing all discounts). These prices did not change in the second 
week for those participants in the “Control” and the “Environmental recall” treatment. In the 
second week, participants in both treatments with a carbon tax were presented with prices that 
reflected the carbon content of the products available in store. This carbon tax, measured as the 
CO2e content of each product multiplied by a £70/tonne of CO2e (in line with estimates from 
DECC 2016), was added to the baseline price, which on average raised food prices by 8.47%. 
To ensure the visibility of the carbon tax, consumers were presented with full prices (i.e. 
inclusive of the tax), with the addition of a line below the price indicating “This price includes 
£[value] of carbon tax” (see Figure 1 above). For the reasons discussed in section 2.3, total tax 
revenues were redistributed to participants in the treatments with a carbon tax, who were 
reimbursed by the average tax paid. Participants facing a carbon tax manipulation were notified 
of this redistribution before the shopping task, where the instructions read (full instructions can 
be found in the online appendix; emphasis is as presented to participants):   
The total revenues raised from the carbon tax (i.e. from all participants) will be 
shared equally between all taxpayers: everyone in this treatment (including you) will 
receive back exactly the same amount of tax revenue at the end of the experiment. 
Rational consumers knowing the presence of a redistribution mechanism in advance would be 
expected to make decisions that reflect the fact that income effects would be neutralised. 
Importantly, note that payment was received at the end of the experiment, whether from the 
initial endowment or from the redistribution mechanism. We return to the issue of potential 
income effects in Sections 4.2 and 4.7.  
3.2. Measuring the carbon footprint of baskets  
As discussed in Section 1, sustainable consumption of the consumer in each weekly shopping 
episode is measured in terms of the carbon footprint of the basket in grams of CO2e, to 
circumvent problems of aggregation of products that can differ noticeably in product quality. 
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Econometrically, this represents the consumer demand for carbon footprint. Similarly, as 
already noted above, the frequency of the behaviour from the environmental recall 
questionnaire reported in Table 1 was converted into grams of CO2e saved in the previous week 
by engaging in the environmental activities. This meant that the amount of carbon savings 
based on the recalled behaviours  was measured in the same metric as the environmental impact 
of the basket.  
3.3. Measuring environmental identity, self-image, knowledge, and attitudes  
The analysis below uses a number of constructs from the literature on moral and prosocial 
behaviour. The first item is an “environmental identity” scale, adapted from the moral identity 
scale of Aquino and Reed (2002). As expected, the principal component analysis yielded two 
factors (see online appendix 2): the internalisation component of identity, which measures how 
central environmental identity is to the self-concept of the consumer; and the symbolisation 
component, which measures how much the respondent believes his actions reflect this 
environmental identity. The variable used in the regression is the estimated Bartlett score. 
Following Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011), environmental self-image is measured as 
the answer to the question “Compared to the environmentally-friendly person I want to be, I 
am…”; the scale goes from 1 = “Much less environmentally friendly than the person I want to 
be” (insufficiently environmental self-image, and moral “debit”), to 9 = “Much more 
environmentally-friendly than the person I want to be” (excessively environmental self-image, 
and moral “credit”); the centre of the scale is 5 = “Exactly as environmentally friendly as the 
person I want to be” (no discrepancy in self-image). Knowledge of product carbon footprint 
was measured as the sum of correct answers to four questions asking participants to identify 
high carbon options within four pairs of goods present in the store (see the online appendix). 
Finally, following Cornelissen et al. (2008) pro-environmental attitudes refer to the answers to 
three questions: “How do you feel about environmental behaviours?”, “How do you feel about 
performing environmental behaviours?”, and “How important is it that you perform 
environmental behaviours?”; the responses to these three attitude questions, collected using 
three 7-point Likert scales (1=very negative, and 7=very positive), in the analyses that follow 
were summed into a single composite score.   
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4. RESULTS 
This section presents evidence of the impact of the environmental recall requirement and 
carbon tax on consumer behaviour. Results indicate that a carbon tax reduces the carbon 
footprint of food baskets, with estimates that are robust to variable choice and model 
specification; the requirement to recall past environmental behaviours also leads to a reduction 
in carbon footprint, with estimates that are robust across regressions, although significance can 
change depending on the variables included. The two effects are similar in magnitudes: the 
environmental recall task produces reductions comparable to those of a £70/tonnes CO2e tax. 
The two treatment manipulations do not interact significantly. In presenting these results, we 
begin by introducing the characteristics of the sample, with a particular focus on expenditures, 
carbon consumed and saved, and consumers’ environmental self-image. These steps are then 
followed by a regression analysis to test the hypotheses discussed in Section 2.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
The experiment collected information on 199 participants allocated to the main experiment, 
plus 31 consumers in the “Control – SI After” where self-image was measured after shopping. 
Table 2 shows the demographic breakdown of all treatments, showing that, apart from the share 
of British nationals, groups did not differ significantly in their demographic composition. 
Similarly, the groups did not differ in their reported environmental self-image in both 
experimental weeks.  
4.2. Consumer expenditures across weeks 
We begin by analysing expenditures across treatment group. Table 3 shows that consumers 
spent non-significantly different amounts of money in all treatments in both weeks14; at the 
same time, in the second week expenditures dropped significantly in all groups except the 
“Control – SI After”. This expenditure drop is particularly relevant for consumers facing a 
carbon tax: they could have been avoiding the taxed goods in the experimental store in order 
to buy them in a regular store afterwards by increasing savings, thus lowering the carbon 
footprint of the baskets without actually changing their overall consumption pattern. However, 
                                                          
14 Notably, only one person in the “Control” condition spent nothing in the second week of shopping; while 
everyone bought something in the first week. 
18 
 
Table 3 shows that consumers in the tax treatment actually spent more than the control by 
(partially) saving less (by £0.30, relative to the “Control” condition). While the small samples 
imply the lack of a statistically significant difference, these descriptive statistics suggest that 
consumers in the tax treatment did not substitute to the outside good, a finding that is consistent 
with previous research that showed that consumer expenditures outside an experimental online 
store were not influenced by the decision made during the experiment15 (Zizzo et al. 2016). We 
return to this point in section 4.7, where we analyse the allocation of budget to different 
expenditure classes across treatments. 
4.3. The characteristics of the baskets across weeks 
The change in expenditures across the different groups observed in the previous section 
resulted in a change in the composition of the baskets in each treatment. Table 4 indicates that 
basket carbon footprint dropped significantly in all treatments in the second week (except in 
the “Control” and the “Control – SI After” groups). This pattern is shown in Figure 3. The 
carbon footprint per £ spent also decreased in the presence of a tax, with the largest drop in 
total carbon footprint when the tax and the environmental recall treatment manipulations were 
jointly presented. These results suggest that the reduction in carbon footprint in the presence 
of a tax was not determined by consumers spending less on their basket, but by consumers 
purchasing less carbon footprint per GBP spent. At the same time, Table 4 shows that the 
amount of kilocalories purchased in the “Tax” condition followed similar time patterns as the 
Control” condition. This point presents further supports to the notion that consumers in the tax 
treatment did not drastically reduce their consumption needs because of the higher price: 
consumer needs (in terms of kilocalories needed) did not vary relative to the “Control” group. 
Notably, all experimental groups showed a decline in protein consumption; in addition, 
consumers facing a tax (alone or jointly with recall) purchased less salt, while the presence of 
an environmental recall questionnaire reduced the consumption of fats. Consumption of sugar 
was unaffected by the experimental manipulations. This nutritional profile (less protein, less 
fats, no sugar change) points to a reduction in the consumption of products of animal origin 
(fresh or in ready meals).  
                                                          
15 It is worth noticing that while the store was similar, Zizzo et al. (2016) focussed only on two sets of products 
(soft drinks and breakfast cereals). However, the work is conceptually close, with consumers making multiple 
choices and being randomly selected to receive one directly home.  
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Finally, as expected, the consumption of carbon footprint is strongly correlated over 
supermarket visits, revealing a noticeable habitual component. The Spearman rank correlation 
between the carbon footprint of the baskets in the first and second weeks was ρ = 0.83 (p < 
0.001) in the “Control treatment”, 0.80 in the “Control – SI After” treatment,  ρ = 0.87 (p < 
0.001) in the “Tax” treatment, ρ = 0.80 (p < 0.001) in the “Environmental recall” treatment, 
and  ρ = 0.58 (p < 0.001) in the “Tax + environmental recall” treatment. These values indicate 
that the joint presence of the recall questionnaire and the tax had the most disruptive effect on 
habits, as also reflected by a strong drop in carbon footprint.    
4.4. Environmental self-image  
A consumer’s moral self-image is a theoretically important motivator of moral behaviour, 
because it enables a measure of the consumer’s perceived distance from a desired level of 
morality16 (Monin and Jordan 2009). As such, we would expect a positive correlation between 
environmental self-image and CO2e consumption, ceteris paribus: holding the target moral 
stock constant, consumers who report doing less well than they wish with respect to the 
environment should build baskets with less CO2e compared to those who report no discrepancy 
in self-image (moral cleansing effect); these in turn would be expected to put less carbon 
footprint in their basket compared to those who report doing better than they wish (moral 
licensing effect). To ensure the value only referred to the mental state of the consumer prior to 
any purchase, the self-image question was asked before the shopping trip, except for the 
additional “Control – SI After” condition17.  
Table 5 shows that environmental self-image is related to the symbolization (but not the 
internalisation) component of environmental identity (as in Jordan et al. 2011). However, the 
correlation between environmental self-image and the carbon footprint of the basket is weak: 
while the environmental self-image score of participants is as expected negatively correlated 
to the carbon footprint of a basket in all treatment groups (i.e., as self-image increases, the 
                                                          
16 A test of internal validity shows that this metric is fairly stable across time period. In fact, the Spearman rank 
correlations across treatments are as follows: “Control” = 0.7295, p = 0.000; “Environmental Recall” = 0.5859 (p 
= 0.000); “Tax” = 0.7306 (p = 0.000); “Tax + Environmental Recall” = 0.3069 (p = 0.032). 
17 The position of the environmental self-image question influenced the response given: participants who answered 
this question after shopping (the “Control – SI After” treatment) reported a lower self-image compared to the rest 
of the sample in week 1 (p < 0.05 if tested against all treatments; p < 0.10 if tested against the “Control” treatment 
only), suggesting that the act of shopping in itself made people feel relatively environmentally-unfriendly; the 
effect is not present in week 2 (p > 0.10 when tested against all treatments, as well as when tested against “Control” 
treatment only). 
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carbon footprint of the baskets decreases), these relationships are significant only in week 2 for 
participants in the “Environmental recall” and “Control” treatments, and in an overall analysis 
of the whole sample18. As a result, the consumer’s environmental self-image does not appear 
to be a strong motivator of the construction of low-carbon baskets (however, note that this 
relationship is correlational rather than causal), and other aspects of the psychological profile 
of consumers may play a more dominant role. Importantly, Figure 4 shows that the presence 
of the environmental self-image question before the shopping trip did not prime participants: 
those who answered the environmental self-image question before shopping bought a non-
significantly higher (rather than lower) carbon footprint in their basket in both weeks. Finally, 
a median test reveals that the median drop in basket carbon footprint in the “Control – SI After” 
group is not different from the “Control” group (p = 0.548).  
4.5. Estimated carbon savings from the environmental recall questionnaire 
All participants filled the environmental recall questionnaire (see Table 1). Importantly, only 
participants in the environmental recall group filled this questionnaire just after logging into 
the online shop: these participants actually knew their estimated carbon savings before 
shopping in the second week. These scores were calculated by deriving an overall estimate of 
the carbon footprint consumers reported saving in the past week by engaging in 
environmentally-friendly behaviours.  In the sample, no participant reported zero carbon 
savings (mean = 13,034 gCO2e, median = 12,202 gCO2e), with no differences in the 
distributions across experimental treatments19. The amount of recalled carbon savings in the 
previous week may be expected to be positively related to the environmental self-image score 
of the consumer, as a person with large savings is more likely to believe she has done enough 
(or more than enough) for the environment; however, a non-parametric local polynomial 
regression (Fan and Gijbels 1996) shows that the relationship between these metrics is fairly 
flat (Figure 5), with a non-significant Spearman correlation (Table 5). Similarly, the estimated 
amount of carbon savings outside the store in the previous week and carbon purchased inside 
the store in week 2 do not appear to complement or substitute each other: the Spearman 
                                                          
18 The whole sample in this case includes participants in all 5 treatments. The correlation coefficient of the “All 
sample” column in Table 4 remains significant if the two controls are removed, either individually or jointly.   
19 A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that, relative to the “Control” treatment, treatments do not 
have significantly different distributions: “Tax” treatment (D = 0.1376, p-value = 0.665); “Environmental recall” 
treatment (D = 0.1581, p-value = 0.48); “Tax + environmental recall” treatment (D = 0.0816, p-value = 0.99). 
Median carbon savings did not differ across these treatments (median test, χ2(3) = 2.3697, p = 0.50).  
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correlation coefficients are not significantly different from zero (“Control”: ρ = 0.12, p = 0.40; 
“Environmental recall”: ρ = 0.15, p = 0.30; “Tax”: ρ = -0.18, p = 0.20; “Tax + Environmental 
recall”: ρ = -0.05, p = 0.72). Together, these results indicate that the carbon footprint of the 
present sample of consumers was not linked across the different domains (as would be the case 
under mental accounting, see the literature cited by Milkman and Beshears 2009), and 
participants did not use their self-reports of the activities in Table 1 to determine their 
environmental self-image.  
4.6. Environmental recall, carbon taxation, and the carbon footprint of food baskets 
The aim of this section is to estimate equation (7), testing the experimental hypotheses 
concerning the impact of the requirement to recall environmental behaviours and carbon 
taxation on the carbon footprints of food baskets. Covariates are added progressively to the 
regressions: a first regression adjusts for treatment dummies only, and is estimated using a OLS 
regression (model A); a second regression adds the CO2e of the basket in the previous week to 
equations (7) and (8) only, estimating a two-equation system (model B); a third regression adds 
demographics (gender, age, British nationality) to all equations, and carbon saved to equation 
(7) (model C); a fourth regression adds psychological variables (identity scales, and 
environmental attitudes), day of shopping trip, and, for in-store equations, knowledge of 
product carbon footprint (model D); and a fifth regression adds the logarithm of total 
expenditures to in-store equations (7) and (9) (model E). In these regressions, the 
environmental recall dummy includes all participants in the two treatments with an 
environmental recall questionnaire; the tax dummy includes all participants in the two 
treatments with a carbon tax; while the multiplicative interaction term identifies the joint 
treatment manipulations effect. Because the interaction term is not significantly different from 
zero, it is dropped from the main equation, because its presence increases the standard errors 
of the treatment variables due to multicollinearity (these results, which do not significantly 
affect the estimated coefficients, are found in appendix 2).  
A first set of regressions (the first five columns of Table 6) uses the natural logarithm of 
the carbon footprint in the second week of shopping as dependent variable. However, while 
some participants might have spent a significant amount of money on price premia to have a 
full basket with low-carbon options, others might have obtained a low-carbon basket by 
spending little money. To address the problem, a second set of regressions (the last five 
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columns of Table 6) normalises the carbon footprint by the amount of money spent, using as 
dependent variable the logarithm of the ratio 



A . Both these transformations lose one 
participant who did not buy anything in week 2. Finally, in both equations all continuous 
variables appear in logarithmic form. The coefficients of these regressions, which follow 
equation (7), measure the marginal log-impact of the policy (the half-elasticity). The marginal 
impact of the experimental manipulation on each consumer in gCO2e can be obtained from the 
estimated coefficients as: 
BC
BD
= 7 for the equation using the logarithm of carbon footprint as 
the dependent variable; and 
BC
BD
= 7
 for the regression where the carbon footprint of the 
basket is normalised by income.  
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients from equation 7, which tests the impact of the 
experimental conditions on the carbon footprint of the basket in week 2. These results indicate 
that the presence of an environmental recall questionnaire before the shopping task drives a 
reduction in carbon footprint, providing no evidence of a licensing effect, and instead 
supporting the existence of a consistency effect (in support of H1b rather than H1a). Similarly, 
a carbon tax significantly reduces the carbon footprint of the basket20, providing evidence in 
support of H2. These two main effects are of comparable size. The joint effect is the sum of the 
two individual effects, with no significant interaction between them (see appendix 2): the 
results provide no evidence to support either H3a or H3b, but rather indicate that carbon taxation 
does not alter the environmental motivation of consumers. In terms of marginal effects (on the 
basis of SUR estimates only), carbon taxation reduces the carbon footprint of a food basket by 
2.5-3.3 kg CO2e, while environmental recall leads to a reduction of 2.4-3.1 kg CO2e
21. 
Assuming this shop was representative of an average weekly shop, the average reduction per 
household is 130-172 kg CO2e/year for the carbon tax, and 125-161 kg CO2e/year for the 
environmental recall questionnaire. To put these numbers into perspective, the carbon footprint 
of one litre of petrol is 3.15 kg CO2e, and that of one low-energy lightbulb left on continuously 
for a year is 90 kg CO2e (Berners-Lee 2011). Finally, the tax increased prices by 8.47% (on 
average), and reduced carbon emissions by 15-19%, raising £107.6522; these figures indicate a 
                                                          
20 The only insignificant coefficient in these tables is slightly above the 10% probability (p=0.164) 
21 The average carbon footprint in the basket in the first week was 20,312 gCO2e; the average carbon footprint in 
the “Control” group in week two was 19.9 kgCO2e.  
22 The average tax paid by the 99 participants in the tax treatments was £1.09, or 6.8% of their £15.97 spend. 
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tax elasticity of demand for carbon footprint of -1.8 to -2.2, and a reduction of 23-31 gCO2e/£ 
of tax earned.  
Table 6 also shows that the carbon footprint purchased in week 1 is a strong predictor of 
the carbon footprint purchased in week 2, indicating a strong role of habits in the generation of 
carbon emissions from food purchasing. The estimated carbon savings before shopping are also 
positively related to the carbon footprint in the basket, with an elasticity of 0.07-0.2 that is not 
significant in any regression. Results further indicate that demographic and psychological 
profile variables have limited predictive power on the main equation: in the second week, 
gender is significant only when the regression is adjusted by expenditures, with male 
participants buying baskets with lower CO2e/£ than women; British consumers have baskets 
with more carbon footprint only before adjusting for attitudes and expenditures; while carbon 
footprint knowledge (see section 3.3) is significantly and positively related to the carbon 
footprint of a basket before adjusting for expenditures. 
Tables 7 and 8 show that some personal characteristics also explain the estimated carbon 
savings in the seven days prior to the experimental week 2, as well as the carbon footprint of 
the basket in the first week. Particularly important is the internalisation component of the 
environmental identity (the centrality of environmental preservation is in the consumer’s self-
concept), which is positively associated to the estimated carbon savings, and negatively related 
to the carbon purchased in the first week (only before adjusting for expenditures): consumers 
who value more the protection of the environment reported larger carbon savings, and 
purchased lower-carbon baskets in the first week. The carbon footprint bought in-store in the 
first week did not influence the estimated amount of carbon saved between the two shopping 
trips (Table 7). Finally, a British nationality and strong pro-environmental attitudes (see section 
3.3. for the exact questions) are associated to baskets with higher carbon footprint in the first 
week, but their impact disappears after adjusting for expenditures; and similar to week 2 gender 
is significant only when the regression is adjusted by expenditures, although with an opposite 
sign, so that  male participants bought baskets with higher CO2e/£ than women (Table 8).  
Overall, results support previous research using actual sales data, which found that socio-
demographics and attitudes play a modest role in predicting sustainable behaviour in a retail 
environment23 (Panzone et al. 2016): rather, in this exercise the key factors explaining basket 
                                                          
23 Notably, Panzone et al. (2016) do find a non-significant role of gender on consumption. However, they use an 
indicator of sustainability derived from total expenditures in a category, and expenditures shares, while the present 
work analyses the determinants of carbon footprint purchased.  
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carbon footprints of the second week are past consumption, and experimental stimuli. Part of 
the limited significant effects is possibly due to the small sample in the analysis, which, in 
association with large unobservable heterogeneity in consumer preferences, gives large 
standard errors.  
As a final robustness check, we re-ran all regressions excluding consumers who may 
have been constrained by the £25 budget in the tax treatment. The rationale for this additional 
test is that these consumers may have been prevented from purchasing as much as they would 
have done if the redistributed money was available during the shopping task; in other words, 
the tax reduced the actual purchasing power of their budget, which is effectively below the £25 
of the “Control” group. Results from a series of bootstrapped (1,000 replications) Hausman 
tests comparing the coefficients of the regressions in Table 6 with those from identical 
regressions excluding 2 individuals in the tax treatment who spent £25 show that no coefficient 
in Table 6 changes at a level of significance below 19%. Therefore, we find no evidence of 
income effects operating through this channel in the tax treatments.  
4.7. Analysis of substitution patterns across groups 
The previous section observed that environmental recall and the carbon tax reduced the carbon 
footprint of food baskets, without however showing how consumers achieved these reductions. 
In this section, we study substitution patterns using an almost ideal demand system (Deaton 
and Muellbauer 1980; Dhar, Chavas, and Gould 2003). This model regresses the share of 
expenditure sij of consumer i in seven food categories j (drinks, meat, fruit and vegetables, 
cereals, other products of animal origin, other products of vegetable origin, ready meals24), plus 
the share allocated to savings over prices pik and consumer characteristics as 
23E$ = F + F G ∑ 23(G)G + F!6 + 7. + H    (10) 
where I = 1,… ,8. Di includes the same variables as Table 6, replacing day of the week with 
inventory (i.e., sub-categories where stocks were low). Notably, equation (10) omits the total 
expenditure term, because the budget is constant in the experiment, and results only provide 
                                                          
24 Categories are as follows: Drinks = Bottled Water, Fruit Juice, Soft Drinks, Tea and Coffee; Meat = Canned 
Meat, Chilled Cooked Meats, Frozen Meat, Meat; Fruit and vegetables = Fruit (fresh or dried), Vegetables (fresh, 
frozen or canned), Dried Pulses and Nuts; Cereals = Bread and Bakery, Breakfast Cereal, Pasta, Flour, Rice; 
Other products of animal origin = Dairy Products, Eggs, Fish, Canned Fish, Honey; Other products of vegetable 
origin = Margarine, Oils, Non-Dairy Milk, Sugar; Ready meals = Chilled Meals, Canned Soup, Crisps, Soups, 
Sweets, Tomato Ketchup, Salt.  
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uncompensated elasticities. In the savings equation, consumers are modelled as consuming one 
unit of savings, with price equal to  = −23(EKLM3NE), where the negative sign ensures that 
demand is downward sloping25. The model enforces three restrictions: adding-up (∑ F = 1 , 
∑ F!G = 0 , ∑ F! = 0 , and ∑ 7 = 0 ), homogeneity (∑ F G = 0G ), and symmetry (F G =
F G).  = −23(EKLM3NE)Finally, prices faced by individuals who did not make a purchase 
in a category equal the average price paid in that category by other participants in the same 
group and week. The model is estimated using a multivariate Tobit model, and to correct for 
the endogeneity of prices26 (see e.g., Dhar et al. 2003), we use a limited-information (LIML) 
estimator that simultaneously regresses the demand system with 8 price equations, using lagged 
(week-1) prices as instruments.  
The estimated median elasticities are presented in Table 9, jointly with a Kruskal-Wallis 
test of significance across group. Estimated coefficients are reported in table A3 in the 
appendix. Notably, elasticities are available only for consumers who made purchases in a 
category. A first finding is that elasticities are relatively high; the literature presents no 
benchmark for single shopping instances, but short-term elasticities are generally expected to 
be high. Results also show that consumers in the presence of a tax become less responsive to 
meat prices. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that consumers in experimental treatments bought 
less meat (in terms of expenditures, p = 0.0049, basket weight, p = 0.0028, and budget share p 
= 0.0459); this reduction might have made consumers more attached to any residual meat 
consumption, reducing their ability to respond to prices. Experimental manipulations also 
weakened the substitutability of fruit and vegetables with other products of animal origin and 
ready meals. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that this weaker substitution resulted in consumers 
purchasing more fruit and vegetables (in terms of basket weight only, p = 0.0704), and less 
ready meals (in terms of budget share, p = 0.0423). As a result, carbon reductions may have 
occurred firstly through a decline in spending, and secondly through a substitution of ready 
meals and other animal products with fruit and vegetables. Finally, the results indicate that 
consumers in the tax treatments did not substitute to the outside good more often than the 
consumers in the other treatments, providing further evidence against the existence of income 
effects in the tax treatment.  
                                                          
25 Otherwise, the expenditure share would be positively associated to the value of the savings.  
26 A test for endogeneity using a control function approach shows that at least one price variable is endogenous.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
This article explored the impact of recalling previous environmentally-friendly acts and a 
carbon tax on consumer behaviour in online food retailing. Experimental research has recently 
observed that recalling past behaviour produces compensatory effects in line with moral 
licensing (Khan and Dhar 2006; Sachdeva et al. 2009), as well as  moral cleansing/consistency 
effects (Nikolova, Lamberton, and Haws 2016), in line with self-perception or dissonance 
reduction approaches (Dickerson et al. 1992; Freedman and Fraser 1966). A key question 
addressed by this research is which of these effects appear in complex real life situations where 
consumers are subjected to a multiplicity of stimuli. In addition, current debates on 
environmental policy support the introduction of a carbon tax, but there remain questions on 
the effectiveness of this intervention due to limited empirical research on this topic. This 
section discusses the implications of our results in light of the existing literature on moral 
decision-making and carbon taxation.  
5.1. The impact of environmental recall on the carbon footprint of a basket 
The first element of this discussion is the relation between the recall of past environmentally-
friendly behaviour and the current carbon footprint of the consumer. As discussed previously, 
the environmental recall treatment made the amount of the carbon saved in the previous week 
salient and exactly known (with the general uncertainties associated with the imprecision of 
carbon lifecycle measures). Given the link between present and past carbon footprint, the 
increase in moral self-worth θ could have been used immediately, causing moral licensing, or 
could have been stored to raise the stock of pro-environmental self-worth. Previous research 
already noted that moral self-worth shocks do not always lead to moral licensing (Blanken et 
al. 2015), but it is the individual interpretation of the behaviour as a self-signal of a virtuous 
self-concept that determines whether past virtuous behaviour leads to future virtuous behaviour 
(see Effron and Conway 2015; Mullen and Monin 2016 for comprehensive reviews of the 
literature). This article contributes to the ongoing debates on moral self-regulation by showing 
that the recollection of previous pro-environmental behaviour leads to consistency effects and 
promotes subsequent pro-environmental behaviour. Notably, while psychological studies that 
test for moral licensing tend to use hypothetical choice situations, this study observes multiple 
instances of behaviour using an incentive-compatible mechanism that makes choices real.  
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Methodologically, our recall questionnaire differs from those used in the literature, where 
consumers are asked to write about past pro-social or anti-social acts (Sachdeva et al. 2009), 
or instances of self-control success or failure (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2008; Nikolova et al. 2016) 
in a free recall task. Our questionnaire asked consumers to indicate the frequency of a set of 
pro-environmental behaviours that were presented to them in a list. Because no consumer 
engaged in all the measured environmental activities of Table 1, the task might have reminded 
consumers of how much they had not done in this area of behaviour, possibly causing feelings 
of cognitive dissonance (Dickerson et al. 1992). At the same time, because no participant 
reported zero carbon savings, some consumers may have felt that they had more carbon credits 
than they thought, receiving an unexpected “carbon allowance” that could be spent freely in 
the store (see e.g., Milkman and Beshears 2009). The results support the first of these two 
possibilities: the requirement to recall past behaviour, which provided an estimate of the 
amount of carbon saved in the past week, reduced the carbon footprint of baskets. However, 
the impact of the recall was the same irrespective of the actual amount of carbon consumers 
saved, which was not used to determine the carbon footprint of their basket. This result 
indicates that consumers did not view the carbon footprint saved as an allowance for their next 
consumption task. The lack of correlation between the carbon purchased in the store and the 
carbon reported as saved in the previous seven days could be explained by consumers 
considering these behaviours as belonging to different mental “carbon budgets” that are used 
independently on each other (see the literature discussed in Milkman and Beshears 2009); for 
instance, it may be that carbon saved from past recycling could be used to license current waste-
related decisions, but not to purchase high-carbon food in a supermarket.  
Previous research shows that when an initial act self-signals commitment to a goal, it 
motivates consistency over licensing in subsequent choices that pursue that same goal (Effron 
and Conway 2015; Fishbach and Dhar 2005, 2007). This association between consistency in 
the pursuit of a goal and perceived commitment to the goal is particularly important when 
feedback on successful actions is positive (Fishbach, Eyal, and Finkelstein 2010). As a result, 
consumers may have interpreted the presence of a positive value of carbon savings as a signal 
of their interest for environmental preservation, therefore motivating commitment to the 
environmental goal (see Baca-Motes et al. 2013); this perception may have then increased the 
importance given to the environmental quality of the basket. Indeed, participants received a 
reminder of the (presumably costly) effort they placed in activities that protect the environment 
28 
 
and prevent global warming, and the costliness of an act motivates consistency by functioning 
as a personal signal of commitment to the act itself (Gneezy et al. 2012).  
The recall of past behaviour that specifically required individuals to exert restraint can 
also facilitate a consumer’s ability to self-control. Specifically, the recall of past instances of 
self-control motivates the consistent pursuit of the self-control in non-impulsive individuals, 
particularly when the reason that led to the initial act is recalled as well (Mukhopadhyay et al. 
2008): the conflict between restraint and desire is relatively smaller in non-impulsive 
individuals, and the evidence of goal progress directs the attention to the pursuit of the initial 
goal (restraint), rather than on the failure to progress in the alternative goal (desire). As a result, 
the results in this exercise might be caused by a sample of non-impulsive shoppers who recalled 
past instances of successful environmental preservation, leading to the construction of low-
carbon baskets. At the same time, the recall of past successful instances of self-control has a 
positive effect on the mood of consumers, and increases their belief on their own ability to self-
control, an effect that is particularly strong when past successes are easy to recall (Nikolova et 
al. 2016). Environmental priming may also have been at work, analogously to how this appears 
to work in other contexts in inducing pro-social behaviour (e.g. Cookson 2000; Elliott et al. 
1998; Liberman et al. 2004).  
The lack of a clear relationship between environmental self-image and environmental 
behaviour is somewhat surprising. Theories of moral self-regard view the distance to the ideal 
moral-self as a key factor in driving moral behaviour (Monin and Jordan 2009). This relation 
should exist in all treatments (including the two control groups), and should be stronger under 
psychological stimuli that increase salience of the distance between actual and ideal moral self 
(as in the environmental recall task). However, we fail to find a clear link between 
environmental self-image and carbon footprint: the rank correlation (Table 5) is only 
occasionally significant in week 2 only. Figure 7 also shows that overall the relationship 
between environmental self-image scale and the carbon footprint of a basket is characterised 
by a relatively flat line in both weeks, supporting the evidence of a limited link between the 
two. As the self-image question did not clearly probe recent behaviour27, the failure to find a 
relation could be due to the general nature of the self-image scale and a mismatch with the 
specific domain of supermarket shopping (Panzone et al. 2016 discuss some issues associated 
to the classic problem of attitude-behaviour measurement specificity). However, given the 
                                                          
27 A more precise question might have been along the lines of "With respect to the environmentally friendly person 
I want to be my recent behaviour has been not up to standard/has been up to standard". 
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limited statistical power due to a relatively small sample, we leave the task of verifying the 
robustness of this result to future research.  
5.2. The impact of a carbon tax on the carbon footprint of a basket 
A second experimental treatment tested the viability of an income-neutral carbon tax as a 
means to reduce the carbon footprint of food baskets. Results indicate that sufficiently high 
carbon taxes (£70/tonne CO2e, in line with directives from DECC (2016), and equivalent to an 
average increase of 8.47% in market prices) are effective in reducing carbon footprints. The 
introduction of the carbon tax showed a significant potential for carbon reduction in a context 
where expenditures were real, with baskets containing 2.5-3.3 kg CO2e less than the “Control” 
group (15-19% reductions). This sizeable effect is fairly stable across model specifications. 
Because the revenues from the tax were redistributed to participants in the tax treatment (who 
were clearly notified before they started shopping), these results indicate that consumers 
switched to now cheaper low-carbon options rather than consuming less (and, as discussed 
previously, income effects are unlikely to have affected our estimates). This reduction might 
have been facilitated by the easy access to close substitutes in the shop (e.g. smaller sizes of 
the same good, or low-carbon options), and might not be replicable in contexts or choice sets 
where substitution is more complex, either because a direct low-carbon substitute does not 
exist, or because consumers do not perceive an existing substitute as easy to use or consume 
(e.g. shifting from dairy yoghurt to a vegetarian soya dessert substitute). The effect of the 
carbon tax also adds to the effect of the environmental recall questionnaire, but results provide 
no evidence of a multiplicative effect: the two effects do jointly work in the marketplace, but 
there is no evidence of interaction between them. 
In the experiment, the carbon tax was simplified to the extent that it imposed a full pass-
through of the tax: the price of the good increased perfectly by the amount of the tax, with no 
adjustments of the supply side of the market (e.g. Kenkel 2005). If retailers can adjust by 
increasing prices beyond the value of tax, or can absorb part of the price increase (e.g., by 
switching to cheaper suppliers), then the effect of the tax would be higher or lower than we 
observe in this article. At the same time, the design of the experiment clearly informed 
consumers of the presence of a carbon tax, both explaining its presence before consumers 
entered the store, and announcing the amount next to the price of each product in store. 
Consumers may have used the tax as information on the environmental quality of each product, 
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as well as on the interest of the policymaker in discouraging the consumption of certain 
products (McAdams 1997; Sunstein and Reisch 2014). To this extent, research has shown that 
taxes advertised to consumers may have an additional behavioural effect beyond the pure price 
effect (see Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009; Zizzo et al. 2016). Nevertheless, given the absence 
of the carbon tax in the actual marketplace, the direct reference to a carbon tax was used to 
ensure participants could access information on the tax relatively easily during a time-
consuming task like shopping in a new and unfamiliar supermarket.  
The strong response observed in the results is an indication that consumers are sensitive 
to food price increases. In fact, results suggest that consumers found adjustments in this sector 
relatively simple to obtain, responding to the change in prices by substituting to foods with 
lower carbon footprint. However, consumers might be more price-sensitive in a laboratory 
experiment, particularly if they can substitute behaviour in a taxed environment with 
unobserved behaviour in a tax-free store outside of the laboratory. We show that this behaviour 
is unlikely to have had a significant impact in our data, but cannot be totally ruled out. 
Moreover, because of the design of the tax treatment, and the inability to track out-of-lab 
behaviour, the estimated effect of the carbon tax is an upper boundary of the effectiveness of 
the tax, and real life implementations might result is somewhat lower estimates. On the other 
hand, if the tax was applied universally in a jurisdiction (therefore effectively removing the 
outside good), the response might be somewhat stronger, because consumers would be unable 
to keep the money and spend it on the same untaxed product elsewhere. This difference in price 
sensitivity is an empirical research question that should be tested in future research to validate 
the results from experimental research. Finally, while this study did not formally assess the 
acceptance of the carbon tax in the marketplace, results clearly indicate that a carbon tax can 
be a viable and effective tool for or reducing food-related carbon emissions.  
5.3. The quest for consistency in the construction of sustainable food baskets 
As phenomena like moral licensing gained increasing attention in academic and policy arenas, 
a key policy question is how consumers can be motivated to engage in sustainable consumption 
consistently over time (Joosten et al. 2014; Mullen and Monin 2016). Results in this article 
indicate that policy can motivate consistency in sustainable online food shopping. In fact, 
conventional policy tools like carbon taxes may motivate consumers to reduce their carbon 
footprint, and it is possible that sizeable reductions will be obtained purely driven by the change 
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in relative prices, and without altering the psychological mind-set of consumers. Conceivably, 
other price-based interventions from marketing (discounts) or public policy (subsidies) could 
facilitate the transition to low-carbon food shopping. Apart from conventional policy 
instruments, behavioural interventions can also reduce the carbon footprint of the consumer 
(McAdams 1997; Sunstein and Reisch 2014): a simple nudge like encouraging the recall of 
recent environmental behaviour has a comparable effect (in terms of the magnitude of the final 
reduction) to a sizeable carbon tax in driving consistent behaviour. However, while a carbon 
tax can be implemented in a broader range of shopping environments, this nudge is specific: it 
would easily work in an online store, but not in a physical shopping environment – for instance, 
the consumer could provide information on environmental behaviours to retailer through 
mobile applications, or a short survey before shopping online. Online shopping would also 
allow consumers to monitor the carbon footprint of their shopping basket. These effects remain 
when the nudge is presented jointly with the carbon tax. The interaction between nudges and 
traditional policy instruments is currently understudied (Sunstein and Reisch 2014), and could 
be developed to design effective social marketing campaigns that selectively target consumers 
with different levels of environmental engagement.  
As with most behavioural and experimental literature, it remains unclear whether the 
effect of these interventions wears out over time. In fact, depending on the intervention being 
considered, the policymaker might either maintain the policy mechanism (as commonly done 
for taxes) or remove it (as is the case of exogenous shocks or experimental research in a lab). 
The addition of a long-term perspective raises questions on the long term effectiveness of a 
policy instrument (see e.g. Dolan, Galizzi, and Navarro-Martinez 2015). A limitation of this 
study is that the two-week experiment only allows us to observe the short-run impact of nudges 
and carbon taxes, with no information of the long-term effects of the intervention. For instance, 
consumers might become used to the price increase caused by the carbon tax, adapting to the 
new set of prices over time. At the same time, a dynamic tax that is periodically updated to 
represent the price of carbon over time could prevent this behavioural adaptation. As an 
example, recent research shows that nudges based on social norms can have persistent long-
term effects on energy consumption if periodically re-instated (Allcott and Rogers 2014); but 
the monetary incentives associated to a new tax appear more persistent than the motivational 
incentives of the same intervention (Larcom, Panzone, and Swanson 2017). A study of the long 
term impact of a policy on consumption would require the observation of a panel of consumers 
over a number of time periods in a controlled environment or in existing commercial panels, 
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with periodically changing regulatory set-up. Further research could explore these dynamics in 
more detail.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This article tested for the role of environmental recall and carbon taxation on the sustainability 
of food shopping using incentive-compatible experimental data. Using an online supermarket, 
the experiment showed that a carbon tax has a strong impact on the carbon footprint of the 
basket. When controlling for individual heterogeneity, we also find evidence that the act of 
recalling past behaviour also motivated the formation of low-carbon baskets. As a result, policy 
interventions can successfully reduce the carbon footprint of food baskets through either more 
classical (e.g. tax) and more innovative (e.g. nudges) policy instruments. The effectiveness of 
the different policy options over time is not studied in this exercise, and ways of promoting 
their sustainability over time constitute an important challenge for future research in this 
domain in order to ensure long-term benefits to society.   
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the online retailer  
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Figure 2: Diagrammatic representation of the experiment 
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Figure 3: Changes in average basket carbon footprint across time period, by treatment  
  
Note: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions – “Control” treatment: D = 
0.1348 (corrected p = 0.803); “Environmental recall” treatment: D = 0.2157 (corrected p = 0.136); “Tax” 
treatment:  D = 0.1800 (corrected p = 0.316); “Tax + Environmental recall” treatment: D = 0.2245 (corrected p = 
0.122).  
 
Figure 4: Changes in average basket carbon footprint across time period in control groups, by 
presence vs absence of a self-image question before the shopping task 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 1 Week 2
Control Environmental Recall
Tax Tax + Environmental Recall
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Note: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution – “Control” treatment: D = 0.125 
(corrected p = 0.803); “Control – SI after” treatment: D = 0.161 (corrected p = 0.815). 
 
Figure 5: Relation between estimated carbon savings and environmental self-image in each 
experimental condition 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 1 Week 2
Control Control - SI After
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Note: graphs refer to scatterplots with a local polynomial regression of degree 0 and 95% confidence intervals. 
The graphs only include observations where the self-image question was asked before shopping. The fitted line 
refers to a non-parametric local polynomial regression with local-mean smoothing.  
  
6 7 8 9 10 6 7 8 9 10
Control Environmental Recall
Tax Tax + Environmental Recall
Estimated carbon savings, week 2 (logarithmic form)
38 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: List of environmental activities and their CO2e impact in the environmental recall 
task 
Act/Frequency g CO2e Units  
Eaten a standard 10g portion of margarine rather than the same amount of butter  81 10 g 
Used my own bag for shopping instead of using a plastic bag supplied by the 
retailer 
10 Bag 
Eaten 100g of meat substitutes rather than 100g of beef 
100g of meat equals to: a 5oz rump steak; just over a portion of Sunday roast 
 (three thin-cut slices of roast = 90g); or a bit more than one quarter-pounder beef 
burger (= 78g). 
215.7 100 g 
Took a shorter (2-minute) shower than the UK average (8-minute) 540 Shower 
Walked rather than driven to go to University  106 Km 
Cycled rather than driven to go to University 106 Km 
Walked rather than took public transport to go to University  93.3 Km 
Cycled rather than took public transport to go to University  -86.728 Km 
Washed clothing at 30 degrees rather than 60 degrees 360 Wash 
Turned off your laptop completely rather than leaving it on standby 4.4 Day 
Turned off your TV completely rather than leaving it on standby 4.4 Day 
Turned off the tap when brushing teeth 13.5 Times 
Did not waste any of the food on my plate when eating in a meal.  480 Plate 
Recycled one plastic bottles 44.5 Bottle 
Recycled one aluminium can  70 Can 
Put an old newspaper in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin 225 Newspaper 
Put an old magazine in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin 600 Magazine 
Recycled the equivalent of one 750-ml glass bottle (typical size of a wine bottle) 73.9 750 ml bottle 
Recycled the equivalent of one 500-ml glass bottle (typical size of a one-pint beer 
or milk bottle) 
112 500 ml bottle 
Recycled the equivalent of one 330-ml glass bottle (typical size of a small beer 
bottle) 
168 330 ml bottle 
I turned off unnecessary lights in my home (enter number of days) 665.7 Day 
 
Table 2: Summary demographics of the sample by treatment 
 
Control – 
SI After 
Control  Moral  
Recall 
Tax  Moral  
Recall x  
Tax 
χ2 
Male 0.23 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.41 3.296 
                                                          
28 This value adds the carbon emissions associated to a shower straight after cycling.  
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         S. D. 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.50  
Age 24.89 23.38 24.40 24.80 23.36 1.777 
         S. D. 9.88 4.64 6.73 5.91 4.18  
British  0.55 0.49 0.67 0.46 0.33 9.094* 
         S. D. 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.47  
Member of Environmental  
Association 
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.179 
         S. D. 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.24  
CO2e Savings (g) – week 2 13,133  12,774 13,386 13,004 12,898 0.776 
         S. D. 4,844 4,992 5,430 5,310 4,663  
Env. Self-Image – week 1 3.68 4.18 4.33 4.18 4.29 4.58 
 1.51 1.69 1.51 1.59 1.57  
Env. Self-Image – week 2 3.87 4.18 4.29 4.30 4.61 2.99 
 1.02 1.45 1.51 1.68 1.73  
Observations 31 49 51 50 49  
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Note: χ2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-Wallis 
Test comparing demographics across group.  
 
Table 3: Summary expenditures and saving statistics by treatment group and week.  
 
 Expenditures  Tax paid Savings N 
 
Week 1 2 2 1 2  
Control – SI After Mean £19.18 £18.25 0 £5.82 £6.75 31 
 S. D. 5.90 6.31 0 5. 90 6.31  
        Change  -£0.94   £0.94  
Control Mean £17.73 £16.58 0 £7.27 £8.42 49 
 S. D. 7.29 7.45 0 7.29  7.46  
         Change  -£1.16*   £1.16*  
Env. Recall Mean £17.63 £16.48 0 £7.37 £8.52 51 
 S. D. 6.81 7.47 0 6.81  7.47  
         Change  -£1.16*   £1.16*  
Tax Mean £17.47 £16.59 £1.14  £7.53 £8.41 50 
 S. D. 7.12 8.06 0.67 7.12 8.06  
         Change  -£0.88* -  £0.88*  
Tax + Env. Recall Mean £17.02 £15.33* £1.03 £7.98 £9.67 49 
 S. D. 7.33 8.31 0.69 7.33 8.31                 
         Change  -£1.69* -  £1.69*  
Kruskal-Wallis χ2  1.422 2.262 203.771*** 1.422 2.263  
Note: Expenditures in the tax treatment refer to gross expenditures (i.e. with tax); savings refer to the unspent 
balance before the redistribution of tax revenues. A significant change refers to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test between the variable in Week 2 and Week 1. χ2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-Wallis Test 
comparing expenditures, tax paid, and savings across the five groups. Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 
5%; *** = 1%.     
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Table 4: Summary basket statistics by treatment group and week.  
 
 CO2 footprint (gCO2e) CO2 footprint/£ Kilocalories Fats (g) Salt (g) Proteins (g) Sugars (g)  N 
 
Week 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Control - After SI Mean 19,142 17,722 1,003 1,000 13,165 11,912 480 446 21 20 520 449 427 443 31 
 S. D. 8,808 7,208 387   313 7,097 6,431 367 393 15 14 241 212 295  355  
        Change  -1,404  -3  -1,253  -34  -1  -71***  +16  
Control Mean 21,381 19,878 1,216 1,226 12,984 11,583 467 398 72 114 535 482 406 426 49 
 S. D. 1,491 1,319 361 494 7,303 7,163 393 348 237 330 249 242 257  288  
         Change  -1,503  -10  -1,401**  -69  +42  -53***  +20  
Env. Recall Mean 21,494  19,118 1,200  1,141 13,316 10,661 466 359 58 40 552 476 450 386 51 
 S. D. 1,548 1,634 364 408 8,142 7,455 394 364 209 108 306 279 403 298  
         Change  -2,376**  -59  -2,655***  -107**  -18  -76**  -64  
Tax Mean 19,258 16,404 1,113  1,018 11,794 9,933 373 297 55 35 474 414 482 439 50 
 S. D. 1,461 1,346 457  329 7,602 6,798 307 333 149 107 264 241 324   326  
         Change  -2,854***  -95***  -1,861**  -76***  -20***  -60***  -43*  
Tax + Env. Recall Mean 19,347  15,120 1,187 965 11,811 11,116 463 440 82 33 443 385 429 419 49 
 S. D. 1,471 1,406 518 427 6,937 8,010 436 465 206 108 261 265 316   347  
         Change  -4,227***  -222***  -696  -23  -49***  -58*  -10  
Kruskal-Wallis χ2  2.49 7.14 8.43* 15.25*** 2.29 2.71 2.12 5.04 4.95 8.33* 5.56 5.97 1.65 1.03  
Note: A significant change refers to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test between the variable in Week 2 and Week 1. χ2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-Wallis 
Test comparing behaviour and self-image across the five groups. Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.     
 
Table 5: Spearman correlations between environmental self-image and related variables. 
Week Variable  Control  
– After SI 
Control Recall Tax Tax + 
Recall 
All 
Sample 
1 Identity – Symbolisation 0.239 0.633*** 0.276 0.318 0.374 0.367*** 
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Identity – Internalisation         -0.096 0.060 0.050 0.201 0.158 0.078 
 
CO2e consumed -0.110 -0.106 -0.283 -0.182 0.010 -0.131 
 
Recalled CO2e Savings 0.160 -0.008 0.048 0.029 0.015 0.032 
2 Identity – Symbolisation 0.563** 0.498*** 0.421** 0.245 0.424** 0.412*** 
 
Identity – Internalisation         0.251 0.006 0.068 0.169 0.000 0.055 
 
CO2e consumed -0.098 -0.385** -0.305* -0.115 -0.204 -0.221*** 
 
CO2e Savings 0.327 -0.162 0.187 0.071 0.174 0.087 
Note: significance is based on p-values after a Bonferroni adjustment, regressing multiple correlations of carbon variables and psychometric variables separately for consistency 
in the adjustment. 
 
Table 6: Regression estimates of the impact of experimental treatments on the CO2e of the basket (week 2) 
Model A B C D E A B C D E 
Dependent variable ln(CO2e) ln(CO2e/£) 
Intercept 9.7953*** 0.0183 -0.0066 0.2931 4.9396*** 7.0828*** 2.7936** 2.5712** 2.4510** 2.4585** 
       S.E. 0.0943 1.5438 1.5496 1.5458 1.1026 0.0441 1.1674 1.1301 1.1274 1.1503 
Carbon tax -0.3646*** -0.1855** -0.1515** -0.1419** -0.1590*** -0.2111*** -0.1656*** -0.1472*** -0.1512*** -0.1519*** 
       S.E. 0.1289 0.0750 0.0741 0.071 0.0522 0.0608 0.0493 0.0503 0.0495 0.0496 
Environmental Recall -0.2145* -0.1725** -0.1664** -0.1746** -0.1444** -0.1247** -0.1461*** -0.1375*** -0.1570*** -0.1602*** 
       S.E. 0.1286 0.0831 0.0820 0.0868 0.0594 0.0605 0.0523 0.051 0.0555 0.0598 
Ln(CO2e)t-1 - 0.8228*** 0.8084*** 0.8008*** 0.1628* - - - - - 
       S.E. 
 
0.0604 0.0608 0.0647 0.0967 
     
Ln(CO2e/£)t-1 - - - - - - 0.4997*** 0.5271*** 0.5270*** 0.5329*** 
       S.E. 
      
0.1475 0.146 0.1453 0.1369 
Ln(CO2e savings) - 0.1788 0.1727 0.1540 0.0932 - 0.0831 0.0843 0.0703 0.0710 
       S.E. 
 
0.1616 0.164 0.1705 0.0978 
 
0.0838 0.0807 0.0855 0.0871 
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Male - - -0.1262 -0.1323 -0.1244* - - -0.1596*** -0.1717*** -0.1726*** 
       S.E. 
  
0.0926 0.0920 0.0677 
  
0.0615 0.0615 0.0625 
Age - - 0.0067 0.0069 -0.0004 - - 0.0015 0.0040 0.0044 
       S.E. 
  
0.0064 0.0069 0.0057 
  
0.0047 0.0052 0.0055 
British - - 0.1783** 0.1438 0.0457 - - 0.0578 0.0359 0.0445 
       S.E. 
  
0.0732 0.0894 0.0738 
  
0.0582 0.0664 0.0789 
Identity – Internalization - - - -0.0609 -0.0328 - - - -0.0339 -0.038 
       S.E. 
   
0.0522 0.0364 
   
0.0324 0.0338 
Identity – Symbolization - - - 0.0294 -0.0406 - - - -0.0487 -0.0463 
       S.E. 
   
0.0519 0.0316 
   
0.0346 0.0333 
Knowledge - - - 0.0668** 0.0324 - - - 0.0268 0.0285 
       S.E. 
   
0.0325 0.0260 
   
0.0262 0.0281 
Attitudes  - - - -0.0044 0.0032 - - - 0.0115 0.0121 
       S.E. 
   
0.0186 0.0114 
   
0.0116 0.0121 
Ln(Expenditures) - - - - 0.8659*** - - - - -0.0266 
       S.E. 
    
0.1079 
    
0.0715 
Day of the week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR 
Marginal – Env. Recall -3,802.86 -3,056.83 -2,950.24 -3,094.35 -2,558.74 -2,210.92 -2,589.19 -2,437.91 -2,783.47 -2,840.21 
Marginal – Tax -6,463.71 -3,288.89 -2,686.10 -2,515.97 -2,818.52 -3,742.52 -2,936.03 -2,609.52 -2,679.53 -2,691.93 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.052 0.6345 0.6481 0.6596 0.8233 0.076 0.2837 0.3173 0.3299 0.3324 
Adjusted R2 0.042 - - - - 0.067 - - - - 
Log-likelihood -259.41 -308.18 -547.79 -531.57 -306.42 -110.5 -228.48 -316.03 -309.59 -305.76 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to robust standard for OLS, and bootstrapped standard errors (400 replications) for SUR estimates.  
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Table 7: Regression estimates of the determinants of the amount of carbon savings in the seven days before Week 2 shopping 
Model B C D E B C D E 
Intercept 9.3359*** 9.0302*** 8.8417*** 8.8661*** 9.4093*** 8.9723*** 8.9516*** 8.7869*** 
       S.E. 0.4759 0.4943 0.5822 0.5558 0.8191 0.8663 0.9251 0.9015 
Ln(CO2e)t=1 0.0039 0.0027 0.0254 0.0225 -0.0051 0.0116 0.0204 0.0376 
       S.E. 0.0486 0.0482 0.0593 0.0555 0.1163 0.1157 0.1207 0.1173 
Male - -0.0019 0.0286 0.0287 - -0.0031 0.0301 0.0259 
       S.E. 
 
0.0832 0.0815 0.0813 
 
0.082 0.0821 0.0817 
Age - 0.0132* 0.0103 0.0103 - 0.0133* 0.0096 0.0108 
       S.E. 
 
0.0071 0.007 0.007 
 
0.0073 0.0071 0.0071 
British - 0.0008 0.0645 0.065 - 0.0014 0.0814 0.0687 
       S.E. 
 
0.0687 0.0687 0.0682 
 
0.0695 0.0658 0.0686 
Identity – Internalizationt=1 - - 0.1121*** 0.1114*** - - 0.1044*** 0.1070*** 
       S.E. 
  
0.0422 0.0405 
  
0.0403 0.0403 
Identity – Symbolizationt=1 - - 0.0309 0.0311 - - 0.028 0.0324 
       S.E. 
  
0.0433 0.0432 
  
0.041 0.0416 
Attitudest=1 - - -0.0016 -0.0015 - - 0.0001 -0.0004 
       S.E. 
  
0.0142 0.0141 
  
0.0138 0.0139 
Day of the week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.0000 0.0427 0.1168 0.7957 0.0000 0.0305 0.0373 0.0625 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to bootstrapped standard errors (400 replications). Note: Identity (Internalization and  
Symbolization) and attitudes refer to the answer consumers gave in the first week.  
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Table 8: Regression estimates of the determinants of the CO2e and of CO2e/£ of the basket (week 1) 
Model C D E C D E 
Dependent ln(CO2) ln(CO2/£) 
Intercept 9.4067*** 8.4910*** 7.1024*** 7.1335*** 7.0748*** 7.1310*** 
       S.E. 0.3084 0.6224 0.2614 0.1591 0.2860 0.2645 
Male 0.104 0.0562 0.1190** 0.1241** 0.1171* 0.1154* 
       S.E. 0.1395 0.1399 0.0603 0.057 0.0619 0.0608 
Age 0.0041 0.0105 -0.0100 -0.0078 -0.0067 -0.0090 
       S.E. 0.0116 0.0135 0.0078 0.0065 0.0072 0.0080 
British 0.3421*** 0.2028* 0.0471 0.0213 0.0200 0.0333 
       S.E. 0.126 0.1107 0.0631 0.0565 0.0590 0.0629 
Identity – Internalization - -0.2398*** 0.0157 - -0.0055 0.0001 
       S.E. 
 
0.0709 0.0386 
 
0.0364 0.0404 
Identity – Symbolization - 0.0119 -0.0374 - -0.0352 -0.0373 
       S.E. 
 
0.0581 0.0313 
 
0.0325 0.0322 
Knowledge - -0.0015 -0.0024 - 0.0057 0.0068 
       S.E. 
 
0.0677 0.0282 
 
0.0320 0.0304 
Attitudes - 0.0519** -0.0003 - 0.0017 0.0000 
       S.E. 
 
0.0224 0.0119 
 
0.0109 0.0127 
Ln(Expenditures) - - 1.0555*** - - 0.0321 
       S.E. 
  
0.0823 
  
0.0877 
Day of the week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR SUR 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.0210 0.0659 0.0659 0.0211 0.0572 0.0649 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to bootstrapped standard errors (400 replications). Note: Identity (Internalization and  
Symbolization) and attitudes refer to the answer consumers gave in the first week.  
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Table 9: Estimated elasticities from the Almost Ideal Demand System (week 2) 
Elasticity 
  
Control Env. Recall Tax Tax + Env. 
Recall 
χ2 
Own-price Drinks 
 
-12.97 -15.05 -14.10 -14.01 1.32 
 
Meat 
 
-1.24 -1.31 -0.80 -0.32 12.81*** 
 
Fruit & vegetables (F&V) 
 
-5.78 -3.34 -4.65 -3.62 4.03 
 
Cereals 
 
0.02 -0.19 -1.26 -0.06 0.53 
 
Other animal origin -2.10 -1.66 -1.94 -1.83 2.45 
 
Other F&V origin -30.10 -31.27 -50.07 -17.96 3.53 
 
Ready meals -7.72 -11.48 -11.37 -7.05 0.71 
 
Savings 
 
-19.91 -36.49 -36.01 -17.66 0.71 
Cross-price Savings Drinks 2.11 3.46 3.17 2.29 3.51 
  
Meat 2.33 2.31 2.33 3.56 1.31 
  
F&V 2.44 1.95 1.99 1.94 2.46 
  
Cereals 1.65 1.88 1.81 1.67 0.69 
  
Other animal origin 2.58 2.88 2.02 1.94 3.06 
  
Other F&V origin 3.23 4.83 2.32 1.67 2.05 
  
Ready meals 1.21 1.19 1.28 1.37 0.73 
 
Drinks Meat -1.53 -1.87 -1.41 -3.01 0.54 
  
F&V 2.08 1.86 2.11 1.97 0.96 
  
Cereals -5.30 -4.71 -3.90 -7.47 0.93 
  
Other animal origin 2.46 2.72 2.53 2.06 1.12 
  
Other F&V origin 1.65 2.22 2.05 1.47 4.36 
  
Ready meals 3.23 3.81 4.09 3.20 1.14 
 
Meat F&V 0.70 0.77 0.76 0.64 6.92 
  
Cereals 1.46 1.51 1.44 1.45 0.57 
  
Other animal origin -0.27 -0.41 0.14 -1.32 9.48 
  
Other F&V origin -3.91 -5.41 -6.53 -5.35 1.57 
  
Ready meals 2.03 1.92 1.60 3.32 2.53 
 
F&V Cereals 1.08 1.05 1.08 1.07 1.25 
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Other animal origin -0.45 -0.03 -0.14 -0.06 1.77* 
  
Other F&V origin 4.14 3.01 3.44 4.82 1.36 
  
Ready meals -4.72 -2.63 -4.85 -4.07 3.59** 
 
Cereals Other animal origin -2.64 -3.57 -1.85 -1.50 2.57 
  
Other F&V origin 6.31 5.68 5.35 5.72 0.32 
  
Ready meals -7.27 -5.97 -6.46 -4.62 0.62 
 
Other anim. Origin Other F&V origin 2.59 2.24 2.62 2.42 0.80 
  
Ready meals -2.09 -0.46 -0.62 -0.27 4.97 
 
Other F&V origin Ready meals 8.49 17.26 56.93 10.48 5.24 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Note: χ2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing elasticities across group.  
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APPENDIX 1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALES 
1) ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITY SCALE 
To estimate the moral identity scale, the approach follows (Aquino and Reed 2002). 
Specifically, participants had to identify their agreement with a list of statements associated 
with being “environmentally-friendly” as the only personal characteristic. Answers were then 
analysed using a principal component analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation after reverse 
scoringing the two negative statements (“I would be ashamed to be a person who has these 
characteristics” and “Having these characteristics is not really important to me”). Results are 
reported in table A1 below, and mirror the results presented in Aquino and Reed (2002). In 
particular, the PCA obtains 2 factors: a first factor consists of six items that measure the 
internalisation of pro-environmental identity, the extent by which this identity is central to the 
self-concept of the respondent; while a second factor of seven items measures the 
symbolisation of pro-environmental identity, which measures the degree to which the 
respondent feels this identity is reflected in his actions and behaviours. The variables used in 
the final regression refer to the estimated Bartlett score from the PCA.  
 
Table A1: Rotated factor loadings from the PCA 
 
 
Week 2 
 
Week 1 
 
 
 
Symbolisation Internalisation Symbolisation Internalisation 
1 Caring for the environment is an 
important part of who I am.  
0.4858 0.7078 0.5525 0.6126 
2 I often buy products that communicate 
the fact that I care for the environment  
0.6320 0.4718 0.5535 0.4099 
3 The types of things I do in my spare 
time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me 
as caring for the environment.  
0.8161 0.3108 0.7816 0.2082 
4 The kinds of books and magazines that 
I read identify me as caring for the 
environment.  
0.8255 0.2468 0.7133 0.2964 
5 I am actively involved in activities that 
communicate to others that I care for 
the environment.  
0.8615 0.1869 0.8333 0.2157 
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6 It would make me feel good to be a 
person who cares for the environment.  
0.1062 0.7824 0.2471 0.6778 
7 A big part of my emotional well-being 
is tied up in caring for the environment.  
0.6573 0.5562 0.7398 0.4541 
8 I would be ashamed to be a person who 
cares for the environment. (Reverse-
coded) 
-0.4474 0.4027 -0.4545 0.5631 
9 Caring for the environment is not 
really important to me. (Reverse-
coded) 
0.0394 0.7226 0.1487 0.7427 
10 Caring for the environment is an 
important part of my sense of self.  
0.6050 0.5700 0.6785 0.5021 
11 I strongly desire to care for the 
environment. 
0.2971 0.8226 0.4774 0.6073 
12 I often wear clothes that identify me as 
caring for the environment.  
0.8159 0.0679 0.7696 0.0113 
13 The fact that I care for the environment 
is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
0.8006 0.1060 0.7536 0.0182 
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APPENDIX 2: ESTIMATED MAIN REGRESSION WITH INTERACTION TERM 
Table A2: Regression estimates of the impact of treatments on the CO2e of the basket (week 2) 
Model A B C D E A B C D E 
Dependent ln(CO2e) ln(CO2e /£) 
Intercept 9.7649*** 0.0014 -0.0077 0.2927 4.9380*** 7.0802*** 2.7638** 2.5572** 2.4576** 2.4456** 
       S.E. 0.0965 1.5537 1.5539 1.5566 1.109 0.045 1.1594 1.1288 1.1351 1.1482 
Carbon tax -0.3051** -0.1473** -0.1486* -0.1396* -0.1547** -0.2060*** -0.1369** -0.1284** -0.1368** -0.1371** 
       S.E. 0.1537 0.0734 0.0759 0.0842 0.0614 0.0647 0.0549 0.0566 0.0592 0.0592 
Env. Recall -0.1556 -0.1346 -0.1634* -0.1722* -0.1398* -0.1196 -0.1179* -0.1185* -0.1424* -0.1451* 
       S.E. 0.1487 0.0921 0.0912 0.1037 0.0763 0.0763 0.0641 0.0656 0.0742 0.0771 
Carbon tax*Env.Recall  -0.1179 -0.0758 -0.006 -0.0047 -0.0088 -0.0102 -0.0564 -0.0382 -0.029 -0.0296 
       S.E. 0.2576 0.1527 0.1517 0.162 0.1017 0.1213 0.0988 0.0938 0.0986 0.098 
Ln(CO2e)t-1 - 0.8225*** 0.8084*** 0.8008*** 0.1630* - - - - - 
       S.E. 
 
0.0607 0.061 0.0647 0.0969 
     
Ln(CO2e/£)t-1 - - - - - - 0.5018*** 0.5283*** 0.5275*** 0.5342*** 
       S.E. 
      
0.1467 0.1457 0.1442 0.1368 
Ln (Carbon saved) - 0.1789 0.1728 0.1541 0.0932 - 0.0831 0.0846 0.07 0.0713 
       S.E. 
 
0.1636 0.1647 0.1715 0.0984 
 
0.0851 0.0815 0.0864 0.0878 
Male - - -0.1261 -0.1322 -0.1243* - - -0.1594*** -0.1735*** -0.1723*** 
       S.E. 
  
0.0927 0.0923 0.0676 
  
0.0615 0.0616 0.0624 
Age - - 0.0066 0.0069 -0.0004 - - 0.0012 0.0038 0.0042 
       S.E. 
  
0.0063 0.0071 0.0056 
  
0.0046 0.0051 0.0054 
British - - 0.1778** 0.1433 0.0448 - - 0.0546 0.034 0.0416 
       S.E. 
  
0.0736 0.0901 0.0747 
  
0.0577 0.0712 0.0797 
Identity – Internalization  - - - -0.061 -0.0329 - - - -0.0344 -0.0384 
       S.E. 
   
0.0526 0.0369 
   
0.0333 0.0342 
Identity – Symbolization  - - - 0.0295 -0.0403 - - - -0.0475 -0.0456 
       S.E. 
   
0.0544 0.0325 
   
0.0352 0.0341 
Knowledge - - - 0.06672** 0.0322 - - - 0.026 0.028 
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       S.E. 
   
0.0325 0.0257 
   
0.0257 0.0277 
Attitudes  - - - -0.0044 0.0032 - - - 0.0116 0.012 
       S.E. 
   
0.0189 0.0114 
   
0.0117 0.0121 
Ln(Expenditures) - - - - 0.8658*** - - - - -0.0267 
       S.E. 
    
0.1084 
    
0.0714 
Day of the week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR OLS SUR SUR SUR SUR 
Marginal – Env. Recall -3687.07 -2982.78 -2944.41 -3088.64 -2547.86 -2200.92 -2535.21 -2401.58 -2752.34 -2805.51 
Marginal – Tax -6429.94 -3268.54 -2685.97 -2515.59 -2818.10 -3739.60 -2916.43 -2607.24 -2674.94 -2687.60 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.053 0.635 0.6481 0.6596 0.8233 0.076 0.2848 0.3177 0.3308 0.3327 
Adjusted R2 0.038 
    
0.062 
    
Log-likelihood -259.31 -308.07 -547.79 -531.57 -306.41 -110.49 -228.33 -315.96 -306.32 -305.72 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to robust standard for OLS, and bootstrapped standard errors (400 replications) for SUR estimates.  
 
APPENDIX 3: ESTIMATED DEMAND PARAMETERS – ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM  
Table A3: Regression estimates of the Almost Ideal Demand System (week 2) 
 
Drinks Meat F&V Cereals Other anim. 
origin 
Other F&V 
origin 
Ready meals Savings 
Intercept -0.0359 0.1403 -0.0301 -0.0157 0.4533** -0.1684 -0.1779 0.8343 
       S.E. 0.1875 0.3706 0.2150 0.1343 0.1852 0.2808 0.3604 0.5234 
ln(p Drinks) 0.0057 -0.0276 0.0106 -0.0384* 0.0128 0.0049 0.0136 0.0184*** 
       S.E. 0.0289 0.0377 0.0202 0.0211 0.0278 0.0312 0.0388 0.0062 
ln(p Meat) -0.0276 0.0933 -0.0091 0.0072 -0.0390 -0.0909* 0.0168 0.0494*** 
       S.E. 0.0377 0.0995 0.0382 0.0346 0.0493 0.0552 0.0776 0.0134 
ln(p F&V) 0.0106 -0.0091 0.0063 0.0013 -0.0291 0.0480 -0.0607 0.0327*** 
       S.E. 0.0202 0.0382 0.0287 0.0175 0.0237 0.0296 0.0380 0.0082 
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ln(p Cereals) -0.0384* 0.0072 0.0013 0.0816** -0.0430 0.0468 -0.0677* 0.0123** 
       S.E. 0.0211 0.0346 0.0175 0.0337 0.0276 0.0285 0.0360 0.0050 
ln(p Other anim. origin) 0.0128 -0.0390 -0.0291 -0.0430 0.0697 0.0213 -0.0225 0.0298*** 
       S.E. 0.0278 0.0493 0.0237 0.0276 0.0647 0.0386 0.0504 0.0068 
ln(p Other F&V origin) 0.0049 -0.0909* 0.0480 0.0468 0.0213 -0.1619** 0.1173* 0.0145 
       S.E. 0.0312 0.0552 0.0296 0.0285 0.0386 0.0703 0.0634 0.0095 
ln(p Ready meals) 0.0136 0.0168 -0.0607 -0.0677* -0.0225 0.1173* 0.0002 0.0029 
       S.E. 0.0388 0.0776 0.0380 0.0360 0.0504 0.0634 0.1064 0.0126 
ln(p Savings) 0.0184*** 0.0494*** 0.0327*** 0.0123** 0.0298*** 0.0145 0.0029 -0.1599*** 
       S.E. 0.0062 0.0134 0.0082 0.0050 0.0068 0.0095 0.0126 0.0180 
Environmental Recall -0.0151 -0.0215 0.0200 -0.0143 0.0220 0.0293 -0.0399 0.0196 
       S.E. 0.0162 0.0357 0.0214 0.0124 0.0183 0.0257 0.0325 0.0492 
Carbon tax -0.0181 -0.0476 0.0277 0.0031 0.0268 0.0333 -0.0313 0.0061 
       S.E. 0.0161 0.0353 0.0207 0.0125 0.0176 0.0251 0.0321 0.0486 
Knowledge 0.0028 -0.0010 0.0072 0.0142** -0.0029 0.0066 -0.0077 -0.0193 
       S.E. 0.0079 0.0179 0.0106 0.0063 0.0094 0.0127 0.0163 0.0246 
Identity – Internalization -0.0053 -0.0133 -0.0093 -0.0030 -0.0097 -0.0065 -0.0065 0.0535** 
       S.E. 0.0087 0.0203 0.0113 0.0068 0.0099 0.0140 0.0183 0.0270 
Identity – Symbolization -0.0120 0.0189 0.0306** 0.0069 0.0193 0.0247 -0.0309 -0.0574* 
       S.E. 0.0104 0.0229 0.0134 0.0082 0.0117 0.0163 0.0221 0.0310 
Attitudes  0.0003 -0.0089 0.0014 0.0026 0.0010 0.0014 -0.0005 0.0026 
       S.E. 0.0034 0.0075 0.0044 0.0027 0.0037 0.0055 0.0070 0.0102 
Male -0.0131 0.0126 -0.0361* -0.0085 -0.0386** 0.0206 0.0418 0.0213 
       S.E. 0.0170 0.0369 0.0217 0.0131 0.0194 0.0258 0.0340 0.0500 
British -0.0198 -0.0237 0.0407* 0.0208 -0.0128 -0.0614** 0.0625* -0.0064 
       S.E. 0.0178 0.0402 0.0231 0.0142 0.0201 0.0291 0.0358 0.0552 
Age -0.0017 -0.0055 0.0028 0.0010 0.0045** 0.0037* -0.0033 -0.0015 
       S.E. 0.0016 0.0035 0.0020 0.0012 0.0018 0.0022 0.0034 0.0048 
Ln(CO2e saved) 0.0090 0.0218 0.0106 -0.0023 -0.0545*** 0.0186 0.0102 -0.0135 
       S.E. 0.0184 0.0350 0.0208 0.0131 0.0181 0.0269 0.0347 0.0526 
Inventory: Drinks 0.0848*** - - - - - - - 
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       S.E. 0.0161 
       
Inventory: Meat - 0.1286*** - - - - - - 
       S.E. 
 
0.0352 
      
Inventory: Vegs - - 0.0121 - - - - - 
       S.E. 
  
0.0213 
     
Inventory: Fruit - - 0.0135 - - - - - 
       S.E. 
  
0.0218 
     
Inventory: Bread - - - 0.0435*** - - - - 
       S.E. 
   
0.0114 
    
Inventory: Rice, pasta - - - 0.0362*** - - - - 
       S.E. 
   
0.0126 
    
Inventory: Breakfast cereal - - - 0.0289** - - - - 
       S.E. 
   
0.0125 
    
Inventory: Flour - - - 0.0518*** - - - - 
       S.E. 
   
0.0151 
    
Inventory: Dairy - - - - 0.0559*** - - - 
       S.E. 
    
0.0184 
   
Inventory: Eggs - - - - 0.0397** - - - 
       S.E. 
    
0.0181 
   
Inventory: Fish - - - - 0.0750*** - - - 
       S.E. 
    
0.0217 
   
Inventory: Non-dairy milk - - - - - 0.0099 - - 
       S.E. 
     
0.0326 
  
Observations 198 
       
Wald χ2 (266) 1736.81*** 
       
Log likelihood -401.03 
       
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
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THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RECALL AND CARBON TAXATION ON 
THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF SUPERMARKET SHOPPING  
ONLINE APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for your participation to this research. With your answers we are trying to 
understand what drives consumer choices, and how these factors determine what consumers 
buy during a grocery shopping trip. All the information you give us will be completely 
confidential: we will give you an anonymous ID code, and no one (including the investigator) 
will know the information in the data belongs to you. The data will be subject to statistical 
analysis and will be stored indefinitely in a safe repository inaccessible to anyone outside the 
research team. 
In this research, you will be assigned a virtual weekly budget of £25 to spend on grocery 
shopping online. You can spend as much of this in our virtual shop as you wish. It is important 
that you make choices as you would in any shopping trip you make. At the end of the two 
weeks, we will select randomly one of your two baskets: you will actually receive the goods 
you ordered and placed in this basket, and receive in cash the balance of the £25 not spent in 
the chosen week. Please notice that while we source our products from Tesco stores, Tesco has 
no involvement in this research.   
In addition, every participant will receive £5 as recognition of the time spent in taking part in 
this research. This money, which is guaranteed to you, is independent on what you purchase or 
the answers you give. You will receive the £5 when you collect your basket. 
After completion of the experiment, you will also be able to withdraw within six weeks of your 
last visit by contacting Dr Luca Panzone, School of Agricultural, Food and Rural Development, 
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Newcastle University, phone: 0191 2083594, e-mail: l.a.panzone@newcastle.ac.uk and 
quoting your ID code. 
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CONSENT FORM 
Please tick all in order to proceed. You can ask for details of points you do not wish to tick to 
the Research Assistant.  
I have read and understood the information in the Information Sheet.  
o  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my 
participation. 
o  
I understand that in compensation for my time I will receive £5 for 2 weeks of survey. 
I will receive this money at the end of the second survey. 
o  
I understand that I will be given a notional £25 budget each week and asked to make 
purchases in the online shop; I can spend as much or as little as I choose provided it is 
within the £25 budget. 
o  
I understand that I will receive one of my two chosen basket of goods and the money I 
have not spent in the same week, in which case I will accept the items I purchased. 
o  
I understand that all the anonymised information deriving from the experiments will be 
completely confidential and the data will be stored indefinitely in a safe repository of 
Newcastle University.  
o  
I understand that I can withdraw at any point during this research, including after 
completion by contacting Luca Panzone within 6 weeks of my last visit.  
o  
I understand that the anonymised data will be used for publication of the outcomes of 
this research, and I agree that the data can be used in this way.  
○ 
 
We take your decision to answer the questions to be an acknowledgement that you have had 
the terms of your participation adequately explained and that you give your consent. For further 
information, you are welcome to contact Dr Luca Panzone at any time using the contact details 
indicated above. 
I accept the terms and conditions (Yes/No) 
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Environmental recall questionnaire (when applicable) 
Please pause one moment and think about the activities you have done in the past week (i.e. 
the past 7 days) to help protect the natural environment for you and for others. How often have 
you done any of these during the last week? (randomised order) 
Act/Frequency Please specify the  
number of occasions: 
Never 
Eaten a standard 10g portion of margarine rather than the same amount of butter  ___________times  o  
Used my own bag for shopping instead of using a plastic bag supplied by the 
retailer when shopping 
___________times o  
Did not waste any of the food on my plate when eating in a meal.  ___________times o  
Eaten 100g of meat substitutes rather than 100g of beef 
100g of meat equals to: a 5oz rump steak; just over a portion of Sunday roast 
(three thin-cut slices of roast = 90g); or a bit more than one quarter-pounder 
beefburger (= 78g). 
___________times o  
Took a shorter (2-minute) shower than the UK average (8-minute) ___________times o  
Walked rather than driven to go to University  ___________times o  
Cycled rather than driven to go to University ___________times o  
Walked rather than took public transport to go to University  ___________times o  
Cycled rather than took public transport to go to University  ___________times o  
Washed clothing at 30 degrees rather than 60 degrees ___________times o  
Turned off your laptop completely rather than leaving it on standby ___________times o  
Turned off your TV completely rather than leaving it on standby ___________times o  
Turned off the tap when brushing teeth ___________times o  
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Recycled one aluminium can  ___________times o  
Put an old newspaper in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin ___________times o  
Put an old magazine in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin ___________times o  
Recycled the equivalent of one 750-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
wine bottle) 
___________times o  
Recycled the equivalent of one 500-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
one-pint beer or milk bottle) 
___________times o  
Recycled the equivalent of one 330-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
small beer bottle) 
___________times o  
Recycled one plastic bottles ___________times o  
I turned off unnecessary lights in my home (enter number of days) ___________times o  
 
Please indicate the distance between your house and the University: ______________ 
 
If over the past week you have done any other actions not in the table above that involved effort 
and time to help protect the environment, please use the box below to give a short description 
of these actions, indicating the amount of time (in minutes) you dedicated to them. 
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Over the past week by carrying out these acts you have saved [VALUE TO BE DISPLAYED] 
grams of carbon footprint.  
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Moral self-image scale (Jordan, Leliveld, and Tenbrunsel, 2011) 
Compared to the environmentally-friendly person I want to be, I am: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Much less environmentally 
friendly than the person I want 
to be 
   Exactly as environmentally 
friendly as the person I want 
to be 
   Much more environmentally 
friendly than the person I 
want to be 
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SUPERMARKET SHOPPING 
 
[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THOSE FACING A TAX ONLY – PRESENTED 
JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE STORE] 
In this store, all prices have been increased with a carbon tax that reflects the carbon 
footprint of each product. The carbon footprint is the amount of greenhouse gases emitted in 
the production and sale of each of the products in stock, and the size of the carbon tax varies 
across products to reflect differences in carbon footprint. The tax rate we have imposed is £70 
per tonne of carbon emissions, in line with the estimated long-term costs of climate change 
published by the UK Department of Energy & Climate Change. The price in the store includes 
the tax, but you will see the tax charged on each product. 
Importantly, the total revenues raised from the carbon tax (i.e. from all participants) will 
be shared equally between all taxpayers: everyone in this treatment (including you) will 
receive back exactly the same amount of tax revenue at the end of the experiment. 
 
CHECK OUT OF SHOPPING TRIP 
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Inventory:  
How much of the following food do you currently have in your home?  
 I never buy  
this product 
I am currently 
running low  
I currently  
I have enough 
Pulses o  o  o  
Bottled Water, Fruit Juice, and Soft Drinks o  o  o  
Oil, margarine, and butter o  o  o  
Cheese, milk, and other dairy products  o  o  o  
Fish o  o  o  
Bread and bakery products o  o  o  
Meat  o  o  o  
Vegetables (fresh, frozen, and canned) o  o  o  
Fruit o  o  o  
Rice and Pasta o  o  o  
Breakfast Cereal  o  o  o  
Eggs o  o  o  
Non-Dairy Milk o  o  o  
Salt, Sugar o  o  o  
Tea, Coffee o  o  o  
Sauces (e.g. mustard, ketchup) o  o  o  
Honey and Jam o  o  o  
Flour o  o  o  
 
Willingness to Pay Question 
Suppose you consume 1000 KWh or electricity bill a year. This amount of energy costs you £ 
120/year, and generates 500kg of carbon emissions. You receive a leaflet from another 
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electricity supplier of comparable quality who can give you the same electricity, but generated 
from more renewable sources than your current supplier. Changing to this new supplier would 
reduce the carbon generated by your 1000 KWh electricity consumption by 20%; so by 
switching you would save 100kg of carbon without reducing your electricity use.  
However, this change will increase the cost of your initial bill. How much more would you be 
willing to pay on top of the £120 a year you currently pay for electricity to reduce the carbon 
footprint of your electricity consumption by 100kg? 
£ ____________ 
 
Self-control (Zauberman et al. 2009) 
Imagine receiving a gift certificate worth £50, valid from today. How much would you need to 
be paid to wait before using the gift certificate for:  
• 1 year: _____________ 
 
Pro-environmental Attitudes (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=very negative, 7=very positive) 
• How do you feel about environmental behaviours?  
• How do you feel about performing environmental behaviours?  
• How important is it that you perform environmental behaviours?  
 
Self-perception scale (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree) 
• I think my behaviour is environmentally responsible  
• When I buy a product, I take environmental considerations into account.  
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Moral obligation scale (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree) 
• I feel morally obliged to protect the environment  
 
Moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree) 
1. Caring for the environment is an important part of who I am.  
2. I often buy products that communicate the fact that I care for the environment  
3. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as caring 
for the environment.  
4. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as caring for the environment.  
5. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I care for the 
environment.  
6. It would make me feel good to be a person who cares for the environment.  
7. A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in caring for the environment. 
8. I would be ashamed to be a person who cares for the environment. (R) 
9. Caring for the environment is not really important to me. (R) 
10. Caring for the environment is an important part of my sense of self. 
11. I strongly desire to care for the environment. 
12. I often wear clothes that identify me as caring for the environment.  
13. The fact that I care for the environment is communicated to others by my membership 
in certain organizations. 
 
Social Desirability Scale (short version) (Stöber 2001) 
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Please read each statement carefully and decide if that statement describes you or not. If it 
describes you, check the word "true"; if not, check the word "false".  
 True False 
I sometimes litter.  o  o  
I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences.  o  o  
In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others. o  o  
I have tried illegal drugs (for example, marijuana, cocaine, etc.). o  o  
I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my own. o  o  
I take out my bad moods on others now and then. o  o  
There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else. o  o  
In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences. o  o  
I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency. o  o  
When I have made a promise, I keep it--no ifs, ands or buts. o  o  
I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back. o  o  
I would never live off other people. o  o  
I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed out. o  o  
During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact. o  o  
There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowed. o  o  
I always eat a healthy diet. o  o  
Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return. o  o  
 
Environmental Literacy (objectives: 1) to test if people pay more attention to footprint; 2) to 
test if people have prior knowledge of carbon footprint) 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store) 
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(2 litres of Cola in 1 plastic bottle; 2 litres of Cola in six 330-ml cans; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know). 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store) 
(A pack of 6 own-labelled organic eggs; a pack of 6 own-labelled free-range eggs; Both 
the same; Not sure/Don’t know). 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store) 
(A pint of whole milk; A pint of skimmed milk; both the same; Not sure/Don’t know) 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store) 
(1 litre of Orange Juice not-from-concentrate; 1 litre of Orange Juice from-concentrate; 
both the same; Not sure/Don’t know) 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store) 
 (A 500g portion of Chicken Biryani; A 500g portion of Shepherd's Pie; both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know)  
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store) 
(One Thin Crust Cheese Feast Pizza; One Thin Crust Pepperoni Pizza; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know) 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store) 
(1 litre of lager beer in two 500ml cans; 1 litre of lager beer in four 250ml bottles; both the 
same; Not sure/Don’t know) 
• Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store) 
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(A standard 250-ml cup of latte; A standard 250-ml cup of cappuccino; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know)  
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You are:     
 Male  Female 
 
Your age group: 
 18-25 
 26-35 
 36-45 
 46-55 
 More than 55 
 
Your nationality: ______________________ 
 
Year of Study 
 Year 1 
 Year 2 
 Year 3 
 Master course 
 PhD 
 
Faculty of Study 
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 Science, Agriculture, and Engineering 
 Humanities and Social Science 
 Medical Science 
 
How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 White  
 Mixed  
 Asian or Asian British  
 Black or Black British  
 Chinese or other ethnic group  
 Others – please specify: ________________________________________ 
 
What is your religion? 
 Christian 
 Jewish 
 Muslim 
 Hindu 
 Buddhist 
 None (atheist or agnostic)  
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 Others – please specify: ________________________________________ 
 
What political party do you support or identify with? 
 Conservative Party 
 Labour Party  
 Green Party  
 Liberal Democrats  
 Others – please specify: ___________________ 
 
Membership of an environmental association 
Are you a member of an environmental association (e.g. Friends of the Earth, WWF)? If yes, 
please specify: _______________ 
 
 
 
 
